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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the recent phenomenon of social impact bonds (SIBs). Social impact 
bonds are an attempt to marketize/financialize certain FRQWHPSRUDU\LQWUDFWDEOH³VRFLDOSUREOHPV´, such 
as homelessness and criminal recidivism. SIBs rely on a vast array of accounting technologies including 
budgets, future cash flows, discounting, performance measurement and auditing. As such, they represent a 
potentially powerful and problematic use of accounting to enact government policy. This paper contains a 
case study of the most recent in a series of SIBs, the London Homelessness SIB, focusing on St 0XQJR¶V, 
a London-based charitable foundation that was one of two service providers (charities) funded by the SIB. 
The case study is intended to enable a critical reflection on the rationalities that underpin the SIB. For this 
purpose WKH SDSHU GUDZV XSRQ 0LFKHO )RXFDXOW¶V ZRUN RQ ELRSROLWLFV DQG neoliberalism. The SIB is 
thoroughly neoliberal in that it is constructed upon an assumption that there is no such thing as a social 
problem, only individuals who fail. The SIB transforms all participants in the bond, except perhaps the 
homeless themselves, into entrepreneurs. The homeless are LQVWHDG³IDLOHG HQWUHSUHQHXUV´ZKREHFRPH
securitised into the potential future cash flows of investors. 
KEYWORDS: Homelessness, Social programmes, Public sector, Not-for-profit sector, Biopolitics, 
Foucault, Neoliberalism, Social impact bonds 
INTRODUCTION 
They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there's no such thing as society. 
There are individual men and women and there are families. And no government can do 
anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to 
look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours. 
± Margaret Thatcher, 23 September 1987, in an interview for WRPDQ¶V2ZQ 
This paper examines the technologies and rationalities of social impact bonds (SIBs), which could 
be regarded as the next step in the marketization of public service delivery. SIBs have burst onto the 
public financing scene with astonishing rapidity and near simultaneity in governments around the world. 
They have been initiated in the United Kingdom (UK Cabinet Office, 2012b), Australia (NSW 
Government, 2012), and The United States (Government of Massachusetts, 2012), and are being explored 
in Canada (Government of Canada, 2013), New Zealand (Government of New Zealand, 2012), and 
elsewhere (Social Finance, 2012a). Social impact bonds are intended to make government funding of 
social services contingent on the achievement of contractual performance measures that are attached to 
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named individuals. For instance, a service for reintegrating ex-prisoners into society might be paid based 
on specified reductions in DQLQGLYLGXDO¶Vreoffending. Private investors in the bonds provide the up-front 
financing for the services in the hope of lucrative returns, and so hypothetically bear the risk of non-
performance. Proponents of SIBs claim they promote innovation in social services and bring market 
forces to bear on service providers previously funded by traditional government grants (Deloitte, 2012; 
Social Finance, 2009; UK Cabinet Office, 2012b). 
Our focus is the London Homelessness SIB, sponsored by the Greater London Authority (GLA).1 
This SIB is the most recent in a series promoted by the UK government. It was constructed under the 
guidance of Social Finance Ltd, a financial consulting firm that operates in the social sector, and Triodos 
%DQN D 'XWFK EDQN WKDW GHVFULEHV LWVHOI DV ³WKH 8.¶V OHDGLQJ EDQN IRU VRFLDO HQWHUSULVH DQG D IDVW-
JURZLQJIRUFHZLWKLQWKHFKDULWLHVVHFWRU´(Triodos Bank, 2013). One of the two social service providers 
awarded this SIB is St 0XQJR¶V, a London-based charity (Gentleman, 2012; St Mungo's, 2012b, 2012c). 
St 0XQJR¶V has a long history of traditional programme funding from government sources, supplemented 
by private charitable donations. The St 0XQJR¶V case permits us to study the detailed reconfiguration of 
funding and governance associated with the use of SIBs in public services, alongside the rationalities 
underpinning the reconfiguration. To perform the study, we conducted multiple interviews with the major 
parties involved in the construction of and implementation of the SIB, including five senior managers 
from the three key organizations involved in the funding arrangement, along with other figures from the 
voluntary/charitable sector. We also analysed extensive documentary evidence on St 0XQJR¶V, SIBs and 
the London Homeless SIB. SIBs are still at the experimental phase and so this paper presents the 
opportunity to see the technologies and rationalities of the actors, as well as the changes implemented, as 
they are happening. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the use of accounting in effecting social policy in 
the neoliberal era. It illuminates the rationalities and mechanisms of neoliberal governance (Harvey, 
                                                     
1 The GLA is made up of the London Assembly and the Mayor. The Mayor oversees /RQGRQ¶Vessential activities 
including transport, disaster planning, and policing. The London Assembly scrutinises the Mayor's decisions. 
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2005; Kotz, 2011) that have produced what Donzelot (2008) FDOOHG³the transition from the social welfare 
state to the social investment state´ (cited in Willse, 2010, p. 173). In particular, it seeks to understand 
how social impact bonds have been used to introduce market mechanisms and financial incentives into 
areas of social policy traditionally governed by bureaucratic mechanisms and formerly considered 
inappropriate for marketization (Cooper & Taylor, 2005), In this field, Woolford and Curran (2013) 
LGHQWLI\DQHHG IRU WKHRUL]DWLRQRI WKH³FRQFHSWXDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ WKHQHROLEHUDOHUDDQGFKDQJLQJ
social service practices.´This paper draws upon the tools of Foucault¶V (1978, 2008) biopolitics to help 
answer this call. While SIBs are still at the experimental stage, in terms of the marketization/privatization 
of social services, from a public policy perspective they represent a radical fissure. Traditional 
privatisation initiatives simply offer private investors the chance to provide services to the state in return 
for a guaranteed payment. As will be described in more detail later in the paper, SIBs are in practice a 
series of payment-by-results contracts in which named homeless people are the targets of various 
performance outcome metrics. In effect, homeless people become commodities, in that they themselves 
carry the potential to produce future cash flows for investors. 
In addition, this paper extends our understanding of how accounting is used to structure discourse 
around social goals and the government of populations (Graham, 2010; Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Miller & 
Rose, 1990; Rose, 1991). As others have argued, neoliberal reforms of government do not so much reduce 
the welfare state, as outsource the social service function of government to diverse locations and non-state 
actors (Schram, Soss, Houser, & Fording, 2010, p. 742). We investigate the accounting mechanisms that 
participate in this. We extend research on how accounting is used to shift the boundary between public, 
private, and nonprofit sectors (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; 0LOOHU.XUXQPlNL	2¶/HDU\; Neu, 
2006) by showing how financial innovation changes the allocation of risk in attempting to expose 
nonprofit service providers to pressure from investors. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In our analysis, ZH ZLOO GUDZ KHDYLO\ RQ 0LFKHO )RXFDXOW¶V development of the concept of 
³ELRSROLWLFV´(Foucault, 1978, 2008). Biopolitics is the endeavour to rationalise the problems presented to 
governmental practice by the group of living human beings constituted as a population (Foucault, 2008).2 
,Q )RXFDXOW¶V (2008) analysis, he argued that the problems presented to governmental practice by 
³SRSXODWLRQ´ FRXOG QRW EH GLVDVVRFLDWHG IURP WKH IUDPHZRUN RI SROLWLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\ ZLWKLQ ZKLFK WKH\
appeared, namely liberalism. Foucault saw liberalism as a method of rationalising the exercise of 
JRYHUQPHQWUHVRQDWLQJZLWKLWVSULQFLSOHWKDW³µ2QHDOZD\VJRYHUQVWRRPXFK¶²or at least, one should 
DOZD\V VXVSHFW WKDW RQH JRYHUQV WRR PXFK´ (Foucault, 2008, p. 319). That is, Foucault does not see 
liberalism as an unrealized utopia but as a tool for criticising modes of government or the state. 
)RXFDXOW¶s work on biopolitics sets out a complex historical depiction of the birth of 
neoliberalism. Foucault compared German post-war neoliberalism (Ordo-liberalism) and American 
neoliberalism of the Chicago School. Both Ordo-liberalism and the Chicago School maintained the liberal 
concern with excessive government. In the case of Ordo-liberalism, the excessive government was the 
Third-Reich (Nazi totalitarianism), and for the Chicago School, it was Simons, the New Deal, and the 
economic and social programmes generally supported by post-war Democratic administrations in the US. 
Ordo-liberalism worked on the thesis that competition was the best way to prevent excessive private or 
public concentrations of power, so government regulation should be used to establish and promote free 
markets. But, it should also include a policy of social interventions (unemployment pay, healthcare 
coverage, a housing policy, and so on) WR³VRFLDOL]H´WKHULVNVLQKHUHQWLQIUHHPDUNHWHFRQRPLFV\VWHPV.3 
American neoliberalism, in contrast, sought to place risk back onto the shoulders of individuals and to 
                                                     
2 'HYHORSLQJ)RXFDXOW¶VELRSROLWLFVLQDPRUHFRQWHPSRUDU\VHWWLQJWillse (2010, p. 157) argues that it is ³WKH
register of governance where political economy meets WKHSRSXODWLRQ´  
3 German (Ordo) liberalism offers a new form of rationality according to the model of enterprise, but with a safety 
net. )RXFDXOWH[SODLQVWKDW³7KHHQWHUSULVHVRFLHW\LPDJLQHGE\WKHOrdo-liberals is therefore a society for the 
market and a society against the market, a society oriented towards the market and a society that compensates for the 
HIIHFWVRIWKHPDUNHWLQWKHUHDOPRIYDOXHVDQGH[LVWHQFH´ (p. 242) Thus, Foucault, quoting phrases from Röpke 
(1952), argues that there is a political and moral framework to Ordo-liberalism: ³7KLVSROLWLFDODQGPRUDOIUDPHZRUN
must ensure µa community which is not fragmented,¶ and guarantee cooperation between men who are µnaturally 
URRWHGDQGVRFLDOO\LQWHJUDWHG¶´ (p. 243).  
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extend the rationality of the market into all social arenas (Foucault, 2008; Yergin & Stanislaw, 2008). 
Foucault states that this UHSUHVHQWVWZRSURFHVVHV³ one that we could call the extension of economic 
analysis into a previously unexplored domain, and second, on the basis of this, the possibility of giving a 
strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-HFRQRPLF´ (Foucault, 
2008, p. 219)7KHHQFURDFKPHQWRIPDUNHWUDWLRQDOLWLHVLQWRDUHQDVSUHYLRXVO\FRQVLGHUHGWREH³VRFLDO´
means that financial economics has become a ³JRYHUQPHQWDOLW\´ 
To put this in terms of homelessness, German neoliberalism would have the state put safety nets 
and social programmes in place to protect the most vulnerable and mitigate the negative impacts of 
markets. American neoliberalism would extend economic rationalities into the field of homelessness, 
turning homelessness into a business opportunity and making it productive for the circulation and 
investment of capital. It is this latter (now dominant) form of neoliberalism which provides the financial 
economic rationalities of the present case study. 
ǲSocialǳNon-market Relations 
Thus far, it has been argued that Foucault theorized that American neoliberalism would insist on 
the application of an economic grid to the social field, which has been defined since the nineteenth 
century in opposition to the economy, or at any rate, as complementary to the economy. In practice, 
American neoliberalism involves generalizing the economic form of the market throughout the social 
body, including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through, or sanctioned by, monetary 
exchanges:4 
First, the generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary exchanges 
functions in American neo-liberalism as a principle of intelligibility and a principle of 
decipherment of social relationships and individual behavior. This means that analysis in 
terms of the market economy or, in other words, of supply and demand, can function as a 
schema which is applicable to non-economic domains. And, thanks to this analytical schema 
or grid of intelligibility, it will be possible to reveal in non-economic processes, relations, and 
                                                     
4 So for example, the mother-child relationship can be characterised in terms of an investment over time. This 
investment will form part of WKHFKLOG¶VKXPan capital, which will produce a future income; the mother will receive 
psychical income. ³6RHYHU\WKLQJFRPSULVLQJ«the formative or educational relationship, in the widest sense of 
the term, between mother and child, can be analysed in terms of investment, capital costs, and profit²both 
economic and psychological profit²on the capital invested´ (p. 244, emphasis added). 
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behavior a number of intelligible relations which otherwise would not have appeared as 
such²a sort of economic analysis of the non-economic. (p. 243) 
In addition to the generalisation of the market form throughout the whole of society, American 
neoliberals IXUWKHUEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHQRVWDWHLQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKHRSHUDWLRQRI³IUHHPDUNHWV´ As 
an example of this, Foucault specifically discusses a French neoliberal ³VRFLDOSODQ´IRUWKHPRVWGHSULYHG
in society. The plan involved the introduction of D ³QHJDWLYH WD[´ RU ³XQLYHUVDO EHQHILW´ ZKLFK ZRXOG
ensure ³effective social protection without negative economic effects´ The proposed negative tax 
involved the replacement of the myriad of different social benefits, which were originally designed as 
various forms of social interventions, with a single cash benefit. This cash benefit would guarantee 
supplementary resources to those, and only those, who either definitively (e.g., the old or the disabled) or 
provisionally (e.g., the unemployed or the feckless) failed to reach a sufficient income threshold. This 
benefit would be paid to people whose income was insufficient to ensure a given level of consumption, 
although it would be set at a level low enough to make it always preferable to work rather than receive the 
benefit. 
Foucault teased out the rationalities underpinning the neoOLEHUDO³SUHIHUHQFH´IRUDQHJDWLYHWD[ 
The tax might attenuate the extreme effects of poverty and enable a minimum level of consumption. But 
essentially, it does not seek to modify the causes of poverty. So, it does not try to target government 
spending in particular areas (for example, neoliberals would disagree with the construction of social 
housing with subsidised rents, as a way of dealing with homelessness created in places like London by 
extremely high property prices). Importantly, it should be set at such a low level that it would not interfere 
with the operation of labour markets. And it does not seek to reduce the effects of relative poverty arising 
from the widening gap between the incomes of the wealthiest and the poorest. Advocates of neoliberal 
policy have abandoned of any hope of finding the right social policies or economic interventions to ensure 
a fairer, more equal society ± no more New Deals! 
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Neoliberalism: Human Capital and Entrepreneurs 
Foucault builds upon his discussion of the proposed negative tax to develop his analysis of the 
neoliberal vision of the individual as an entrepreneur. He argues that a characteristic of negative tax is that 
it ensures an impoverished existence for all, but that ³the economic mechanisms of the game, the 
mechanisms of competition and enterprise, will be allowed to function in the rest of society. Above the 
threshold everyone will have to be an enterprise for himself or for his family´ (Foucault, 2008, p. 206, 
emphasis added). Indeed, ³the basic element to be deciphered by economic analysis is not so much the 
individual, or processes and mechanisms, but enterprises. An economy made up of enterprise-units, a 
society made up of enterprise-units, is at once the principle of decipherment linked to liberalism and its 
programming for the rationalizatioQRIDVRFLHW\DQGDQHFRQRP\´(p. 225). Under neoliberalism, homo 
°FRQRPLFXVLV³DQHQWUHSUHQHXUDQHQWUHSUHQHXURIKLPVHOI7KLVLVWUXHWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWLQSUDFWLFHWKH
VWDNHLQDOOQHROLEHUDODQDO\VHVLVWKHUHSODFHPHQWHYHU\WLPHRIKRPR°FRQRPLFXVDVSDUWQHURIH[FKDQJH
ZLWKDKRPR°FRQRPLFXVDVHQWUHSUHQHXURIKLPVHOf, being for himself his own capital, being for himself 
his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings´ (p. 226). 
)RXFDXOW¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHneoliberal conception of humanity as individual enterprise units 
is accompanied by his analysis of the neoliberal conception of human capital. Foucault posited that if 
capital is defined as that which makes a future income possible, then the capital for which the income is a 
wage is, in practical terms, inseparable from the person who possesses it: ³$bility to work, skill, the 
ability to do something cannot be separated from the person who is skilled and who can do this particular 
thing´(p. 224). This idea is founded on a nRWLRQRI³capital-ability which, according to diverse variables, 
receives a certain income that is a wage, an income-wage, so that the worker himself appears as a sort of 
enterprise for himself´(p. 225, emphasis added). In effect, human capital entrepreneurs produce future 
income streams. As an entrepreneur of oneself, the neoliberal individual is subject to disciplinary 
injunctions, such as the care of self (Foucault, 1986). 
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SIBs and Biopolitics 
1HROLEHUDOLVP¶VUDWLRQDOLWLHVZRXOGLQVLVWXSRQWKHHUDGLFDWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQWVRFLDOSROLFLHVDQG
their replacement with market mechanisms. The important point in terms of SIBs is that they are an 
economic incursion into the non-economic; this makes accounting technologies, which can place 
PRQHWDU\ YDOXHV RQ GRPDLQV SUHYLRXVO\ FRQVLGHUHG WR EH ³QRQ-HFRQRPLF´ RU VRFLDO HVVHQWLDO WR their 
functioning. The market mechanisms at play in SIBs are financial market mechanisms. The value of an 
individual unit of human capital is her future cash flows. When a person fails to generate sufficient cash 
IORZVD³IDLOHGHQWUHSUHQHXU´DQGWKHVWate provides funds to this person, SIB accounting mechanisms 
can be put in place to ensure that at least some of these funds benefit investors. 
In both practice and theory, SIBs lay a neoliberal economic grid upon some of the most 
vulnerable in our society. This grid effaces their humanity, replacing it with extreme rationality and 
quantification. Previous work in accounting has considered how this was achieved under slavery 
(Fleischman & Tyson, 2004) and during the holocaust (Funnel, 1998). Some of the rationalities of the 
1D]LUHJLPHLQ WKHFRQFHQWUDWLRQFDPSV IRUH[DPSOHWKDW WKHUHVKRXOGEHPLQLPXPVSHQGLQJRQ³QRQ-
SURGXFWLYH´SHRSOHDUHH[DFWO\ WKH W\SHVRI UDWLRQDOLW\ZKLFK WKH2UGR-liberals wished to eradicate but 
which underlie certain aspects of American neoliberalism. 
,QVXPPDU\WKLVVHFWLRQKDVVHWRXWWKHNH\HOHPHQWVRI0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶VFDUHIXOH[SODQDWLRQRI
the biopolitical rationalities of neoliberalism that are important for the understanding of SIBs. These are 
the encroachPHQWRIPDUNHWUDWLRQDOLWLHVLQWRDUHQDVKLWKHUWRFRQVLGHUHGWREH³VRFLDO´DQGQRWDPHQDEOH
to the logic of the market; that society is made up of individual human capital enterprise units; and that 
the state should not interfere with market mechanisms. In order to provide a context for the homelessness 
SIB, the next section sets out a very brief history of UK homelessness and how understandings of the 
causes of homelessness have changed under neoliberalism. 
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HOMELESSNESS IN THE UK: THE RATIONALITIES OF HOMELESSNESS 
In order to analyse St 0XQJR¶V and the rationalities of social impact bonds, it is helpful to situate 
the programme in its KLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W$OWKRXJKWKHWHUP³KRPHOHVVQHVV´LVUHODWLYHO\QHZODFNRI
shelter has been a common problem for the very poor in the Britain for centuries. 7KH³1HZ´3RRU
Law consolidated a regime of workhouses for the destitute across Britain, centralized its administration 
and introduced a system of homeless person classification.5 This was the first sign of modern governance 
of poverty based on statistics and a division of the population into governable subsets (Graham, 2010; 
Rose, 1991; Rose & Miller, 1992). Workhouses were constructed as a sort of panopticon. Thus, both 
observation and classification of the poor have traditionally been critical components of the governance of 
poverty and homelessness. As will be seen in the case study, the technologies of observation and 
classification of the poor are central to the biopolitics of homelessness in the 21st century. A further 
dimension of workhouse biopolitics is the disciplining effect of the treatment of the homeless ± the 
workhouse is an element of British working class family oral history that serves as a warning against 
falling into poverty (Todd, 2014). While workhouses were later UHQDPHGDQGVOLJKWO\XSJUDGHGLWZDVQ¶W
until the launch of the National Health Service in 1948 that they were either absorbed into the new system 
for hospital use, or became council-UXQROGSHRSOH¶VKRPHVhostels, or were disposed of. 
Homelessness re-entered the popular consciousness in the UK through the landmark 1966 film, 
Cathy Come Home. During the 1960s, researchers began recognising patterns in the growing number of 
applicants to municipal housing (Pleace & Quilgars, 2003, p. 188), and homelessness again became a 
concern of public policy. 
Although homelessness is regarded by some as a structural, rather than an individual, problem 
(Fitzpatrick, 2005, p. 4), social policies addressing it in the 1990s were rooted in notions of individual 
causation and pathology. Nonetheless, research on homeless populations began to recognise complex 
factors shaping the experiences of the poor, and the causes of homelessness began to be understood as an 
                                                     
5 The classification included: aged or infirm men, able-bodied males above 13 years, boys aged seven to 13, aged or 
infirm women, able-bodied females above 16 years, girls aged seven to 13, and children under seven. 
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intertwining of personal life events and socioeconomic factors (Fitzpatrick, 2005, p. 4). Thus, housing-
market forces, unemployment, family fragmentation, discharge from the armed forces, incarceration, and 
debt, alongside the well-recognised factors of substance abuse and mental illness, all became incorporated 
into the analysis of and response to homelessness (Christian & Anderson, 2004, p. 576). 
Alongside the spread of neoliberal rationalities in the late 20th and early 21st century, explanations 
of homelessness began to take on economic terms, with homeless individuals deemed to be consuming a 
disproportionate amount of resources (Crow & Smykla, 2014; D. P. Culhane & Kuhn, 1998; D.P. 
Culhane, Metraux, & Hadley, 2002; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012; National 
Audit Office, 2005).6 The following case study will develop an understanding that the London Homeless 
SIB extends this economic thinking by creating an economic venture out of homelessness rather than 
attempting to alleviate the causes of homelessness, which in London include unaffordable housing and 
scant social housing provision.7 Willse (2010), writing about the application of economic principles to 
³FKURQLF´KRPHOHVVQHVVVWDWHV: 
As economic ventures, neo-liberal social programmes do not necessarily seek an end to social 
problems, but become ends themselves ± economic activities enabling more economic 
activity. (Willse, 2010, p. 175) 
We argue that the London Homeless SIB fits this description and illustrates dramatically the 
many kinds of economic analysis and economic activity around a population of homeless individuals. The 
next section describes SIBs, the quintessentially neoliberal technology affiliated with this particular 
mentality. 
SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
The notion of a market-based bond connected to social outcomes appears to have originated with 
Horesh (2000) 7KLV 1HZ =HDODQG HFRQRPLVW VXJJHVWHG WKDW JRYHUQPHQWV XVH ZKDW KH FDOOHG ³VRFLDO
SROLF\ERQGV´DVDPHFKDQLVPWRDFKLHYHSROLF\REMHFWLYHVZLWKLQGHILQLWHWLPHKRUL]RQV$JRYHUQPHQW 
                                                     
6 For the US context, see http://www.cdaid.org/files/municipal_services/USIGHomeless.pdf. 
7 These were the same causes of homelessness noted in 1966 in the film Cathy Come Home. 
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would issue a bond on the financial markets, promising to redeem it at a specific price whenever the 
specified policy objective is achieved. In his example, a government might issue a bond with a 
redemption value of $10, to be paid by the government to the bondholder whenever crime levels are 
reduced by 50% from current levels. People would be able to buy these bonds at a steep discount because 
the objective is, at the time of issue, so remote; but they have an incentive to buy them because the 
potential return on investment is so high. Those who believe they can influence the value of the bonds by 
helping to achieve the desired outcomes have a particular incentive to buy them. More "active" investors, 
in order to realise a financial profit from their bonds, could spend their own time trying to accomplish the 
social goal or they could finance social programmes of some sort (presumably at the lowest cost they can 
find) in order to see the social objective achieved. Because the bonds would be freely tradable, they could 
be sold any time at market price by a bondholder who had run out of ideas or energy, to someone with 
new ideas or energy to put behind further progress towards the goal. 
This concept has been harnessed in recent years in the United Kingdom, but with some very 
important differences. The UK model (UK Cabinet Office, 2012b) lacks the idealised liberal notion of 
PDUNHWVLPSOLFLWLQ+RUHVK¶VFRQFHSWXDOPRGHO and does not, at least in its infancy, require any liquidity in 
the market for the bonds. The UK version rather represents an opportunity for investors to make profits 
more directly from individually named people. 
The first SIB launched in the UK was directed at recidivism amongst released prisoners. In 2010, 
the bond was issued to fund support services for 3,000 short-term prisoners being released from 
Peterborough prison (Warrell, 2010). Service providers WRRNRQD³SRUWIROLR´ of ex-inmates and were paid 
DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH6,%¶V pay-for-performance contract mainly related to recidivism.8 By January 2013, a 
total of thirteen SIBs had been launched in England, addressing various social problems (Social Finance, 
2013c; UK Cabinet Office, 2013). The most recent, the fourteenth, was the St 0XQJR¶V SIB. 
The UK version of a SIB is in practice a not a bond or debt instrument as the name implies. It is a 
VHULHVRI³VRFLDO/economic IXWXUHV´FRQWUDFWV between at least three separate legal entities: a commissioner 
                                                     
8 Results are not yet available, although a brief preliminary report has been issued (Social Finance, 2011a). 
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or government department; the delivery agency/agencies, which could be charities; and investor(s) 
(Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013, p. 3). 
Figure 1 is the UK Cabinet OfILFH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRID6,%The first SIB contract is between the 
bond commissioner (government department) and the delivery agency/agencies. It sets out a particular 
social outcome or outcomes (performance metrics) which, if achieved by the delivery agency, will 
activate a payment or payments from the commissioner. In the St 0XQJR¶V SIB, the commissioner is the 
Greater London Authority (GLA) and the delivery aJHQF\LV6W0XQJR¶V7KHQHFHVVDU\Iunding or 
working capital required by the delivery agency to achieve the social outcome(s) would come from one or 
more investors. This necessitates a further contract between the delivery agency/agencies and the 
investor(s). This contract sets out the returns to the investors contingent upon the achievement of the 
social outcomes set out in the commissioner/delivery agent contract. 7KHLQYHVWRUVLQWKH6W0XQJR¶V6,%
are the Charities Aid Foundation Venturesome, the Orp Foundation, two individual investors and St 
0XQJR¶V itself. In short, a SIB requires at least two contingent contracts, between the commissioner and 
the delivery agency/agencies, and between the delivery agency/agencies and the investor(s). In the St 
0XQJR¶V6,%, the service providers are St 0XQJR¶V employees (sometimes described as ³navigators´) 
ZKRZRUNIRUDVSHFLDOSXUSRVHYHKLFOH6WUHHW,PSDFW/WGVHWXSDVWKHGHOLYHU\DJHQF\E\6W0XQJR¶V
to deal with the SIB. The target population are a specific group of 830 named homeless people. 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Cabinet Office (2015) 
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SIBs are still in their infancy (and experimental phase), DQGWKHUHLVQR³6,%PDUNHW´DWSUHVHQW 
However, it is entirely possible that future, there could be a market for the investor/delivery agency 
contracts. 
The UK government is enthusiastic about the prospects of SIBs, with a press release by the 
0LQLVWHU IRU &LYLO 6RFLHW\ FDOOLQJ WKHP ³D UDGLFDO DSSURDFK WR VROYLQJ FRPSOH[ DQG FRVWO\ VRFLDO
SUREOHPV´(UK Cabinet Office, 2012a). The government is not only ideologically committed to SIBs, it is 
also putting money into them. So what is missing from Figure 1, in terms of the St 0XQJR¶V SIB, is that 
the government (Department of Communities and Local Government) gave the GLA £5m additional 
funding for the St 0XQJR¶V SIB. In brief, the London Homeless SIB was commissioned by the GLA. It 
split the £5m provided by central government and awarded SIBs to two charities: St 0XQJR¶V and 
Thames Reach. We now flesh out these details in the case study of the St 0XQJR¶V SIB.  
THE ST MUNGOǯS SIB CASE STUDY 
Data and Methodology 
In this study, our primary focus is the way that a particular technology (the SIB) both produces, 
and is produced by, specific neoliberal mentalities. We are also interested to understand better how 
accounting, as an economic tool, assists in what Foucault describes as the economic analysis of the 
hitherto non-economic phenomena (in this case, homelessness) and how it serves as a key technology for 
SIBs. At this stage it is much too early to evaluate WKH³RXWFRPHV´ and/or consequences of the St 0XQJR¶V 
bond. 
In order to understand what kind of mentality would have to be present in the field in order to 
generate the required effects of the technology, we employ a case study approach. We analyse one 
specific SIB, the London Homelessness Social Impact Bond, and thereby are in a better position to 
understand and conceptualize the complexity of such instruments that are based on a very particular 
mentality concerning how to deal with social problems (Flyvbjerg & Sampson, 2001). We concentrate on 
St 0XQJR¶V LQSDUWEHFDXVHLWDGRSWHGWKHPRVW³HQWUHSUHQHXULDO´ approach to the SIB in its creation of a 
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special purpose vehicle (see Appendix 1). We relied on two main sources of information: archival 
documents and interview data. The archival data consists of public documents from government, NGO, 
and corporate sources. We explored government websites in the United Kingdom for information on 
social impact bonds, as well as on housing and homelessness. The national government level was key to 
this research, but devolution to local authorities is part of the financialisation of public services in the UK. 
Therefore, we extended our search to the local level, concentrating on the local authority (GLA) involved 
in the specific programme we were studying. 
The St 0XQJR¶V website and press reports concerning St 0XQJR¶V since its inception were 
explored exhaustively to enable an understanding of the historical development of the organisation. We 
also looked at public regulatory filings related to St 0XQJR¶V (and its newly formed subsidiary, Street 
Impact Ltd.) so we could understand its financial transitions and constraints. We analysed information on 
its connections to the corporate sector, to government, and to consulting firms. We looked particularly for 
accounting and finance information, to see how St 0XQJR¶V was faring financially and to understand the 
importance of this new form of funding to its overall operations. We also analysed how the activities 
IXQGHGE\WKH/RQGRQ+RPHOHVVQHVV6,%ZRXOGEHHYDOXDWHGIRUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHERQG¶Vpayment by 
results metrics. 
We conducted multiple interviews with each of the key actors involved in the construction and 
the implementation of the SIB. We interviewed several St 0XQJR¶V employees (including the Executive 
Director of Finance and Information), the Greater London Authority (GLA) solicitor who has 
responsibility for the SIB, the SIB controller (auditor) at the GLA, and an employee of Triodos Bank who 
worked on the preparation of the bid and employees of other charitable organisations. These interviews 
provided us with insight into specific experiences of the interviewees, as well as the more general trends 
regarding social impact bonds and other forms of financing in this charitable sector and its financial 
challenges. 
All material was evaluated by the three authors independently. Differences in interpretation were 
resolved in discussions and through the iterative writing process for this paper. Where resolution has not 
15 
been achieved, the interpretation has been left open. This approach is particularly appropriate for a new 
social innovation whose consequences are not yet fully understood. 
The London Homelessness SIB  
7KH YHU\ EDVLF ³IDFWV´ RI WKH /RQGRQ +RPHOHVVQHVV 6,% DUH WKDW WKH 8. FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW
initiated the SIB, which would be commissioned by the Greater London Authority. After negotiations, the 
construction of a business case, a bidding process and the enrolment of various institutions, two charities 
(St 0XQJR¶V and Thames Reach) were each awarded half of the SIB. Each charity could earn up to £2.4m 
from the SIB. A specially selected 830-member cohort of named individuals was selected as the target 
population of the bond. The cohort was divided in two, based on geographical location. A St 0XQJR¶V 
interviewee indicated that they were assigned the north and west sectors of the city, while Thames Reach 
got the south and east. Thus each charity was assigned 415 named individuals. 
Our analysis of the London Homeless SIB proceeds in three parts. First, we examine the 
development process of the SIB to articulate key features of the instrument, such as the CHAIN database 
upon which it is built, the outcome metrics, the cost determination and the Navigator Model. Each of 
these features is grounded in, and also perpetuates, a specific set of neoliberal mentalities associated with 
how tKHKRPHOHVV³SUREOHP´FDQEHQHZO\VXEMHFWHGWRDYHU\SUHFLVHVHWRIHFRQRPLFDQDO\VHV 
We then move to an analysis of the different agents enlisted by this technology. A mix of pre-
existing and newly introduced social agents is required to give effect to the SIB. Despite this mix of new 
and old, and despite their different backgrounds (which was clearly articulated in their vocabularies) each 
of our interviewees appeared to express a genuine desire to help homeless people. However, their 
approaches and rationalities were strikingly neoliberal. For example, the banker said that it would be good 
LI WKHUH ZDV PRUH OLTXLGLW\ LQ WKH 6,% ³PDUNHW´ ZKLOH D VHQLRU RIILFHU DW 6W 0XQJR¶V noted that a 
homeless client could make demands and threaten to leave the provided accommodation unless they were 
met. 7KH6,%DXGLWRUZDVFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKH³JUH\DUHD´VXUURXQGLQJZKDWH[DFWO\FRQVWLWXWHGDOHDVH
for the purposes of the SIB, rather than the quality of the accommodation. 
16 
Development of the SIB 
The homeless bond was sparked by the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG)+HU0DMHVW\¶V7UHDVXU\DQGWKH&DELQHW2IILFH. Together, the parties identified a potential £5m 
fund and commissioned Social Finance Ltd., in partnership with the Young Foundation, to develop an 
initial structure through a feasibility study and an outline business case (Social Finance, 2012b). The 
EXVLQHVVFDVHVWDWHGWKDW³:HKDYHEHHQXQDEOHWRLGHQWLI\DUREXVWHYLGHQFHEDVHOLQNLQJLQWHUYHQWLRQV
with realistic expectations of RXWFRPHLPSURYHPHQWV´6RFLDO)LQDQFHES Nonetheless, three 
models of interventions are set out in the business case (Social Finance, 2012b). The highest cost model 
of the three, which was the one selected, included assigning each homeless person to D³navigator´ 
Navigators 
The navigator would be a key worker supporting the homeless client with an individualised 
assessment, helping him or her find a way through the network of provision, and sustaining this support 
over time armed with a budget to support a personalised intervention in the KRPHOHVV FOLHQW¶V OLIH
Navigators would follow an outcomes-based arrangement. The Navigator Model is predicated on a highly 
entrepreneurial approach to service delivery, offering the (very neoliberal) ³IUHHGRP´RIIOH[LELOLW\ZLWKLQ
the constraints of a personal budget, with a set of outcomes to achieve. A tacit assumption in this 
arrangement is that it is not the role of the state to bring about social change through specific social 
interventions.9 This is the role of individual entrepreneurial units (the navigators). 
Accounting technologies in the forms of budgets and performance metrics are at the heart of the 
relationship between the navigator and their homeless client. From the perspective of the navigator, the 
arrangement is in some ways akin to many 21st century management control systems that incorporate 
performance metrics. A key difference is that the outcomes are intimately linked to very vulnerable 
people. 
                                                     
9 Familiar with traditional case-based intervention, St 0XQJR¶V bid drew heavily on activities with which it is quite 
familiar, but the outcomes-based delivery model sharply differentiated traditional case worker relationships from 
navigator relationships. 
17 
FURP RXU LQWHUYLHZV LW VHHPHG WKDW WKH 1DYLJDWRU 0RGHO ZDV WKH ³LQQRYDWLRQ LQ SUDFWLFH´
introduced by the SIB. Other official literature (CASE, 2014; Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2014) continues to herald the importance of navigators. But one of our St 0XQJR¶V 
interviewees said that the Navigator Model turned out to be impossible to operationalize, for financial 
reasons. The homeless people selected for the bond sleep in central London. The kinds of accommodation 
(hostel or tenanted) they could move to are typically located a long way from central London (60-90 
minutes travel), because property prices in central London are astoundingly high. Individual navigators 
would be unable to both work with people on the streets in central London and visit people who live in 
accommodation on the outskirts of London or father away. Navigators would have to spend too much 
time travelling. Despite this, the Navigator Model was a key feature of the SIB business case.10 
A second key feature was the target group of the bond. In order to produce the figures required 
for a business case, it was essential to quantify the costs to the state of various types of homeless people. 
For this, a detailed knowledge of homeless individuals was required. The GLA already had at its disposal 
a fairly sophisticated quantitative database of the homeless in central London ± the ³&RPELQHG
Homelessness and InIRUPDWLRQ1HWZRUN´&+$,1), which will be discussed next.11 
CHAIN and the Inbetweeners 
CHAIN is a database in which various agencies record information about rough sleepers in 
London. It was used to provide human data for the process, through its ability to establish baselines, 
construct an identifiable cohort, and illustrate past success (CASE, 2014). By modelling the pathways of 
different cohorts over time using CHAIN and other available data, baselines of expected achievement 
were created. Without this baseline of human data, the contract would essentially be unworkable. This is 
                                                     
10 The CASE (2014) HYDOXDWLRQGRFXPHQWJLYHVWKHH[DPSOHRI³6LPRQ´who lives in Westminster. He may well be 
an exception, as it is almost impossible to find cheap accommodation in Westminster. 
11 CHAIN contains -- Basic identifying and demographic information; Contacts made with outreach workers; 
Arrivals and departures from short term accommodation such as hostels, including the reasons for departures; Basic 
indications of support needs people have, for example drug misuse or physical health problems 
(http://www.0XQJR¶Vsbroadway.org.uk/chain/information_chain - accessed 7/6/15). The GLA pays for CHAIN, 
which was originally managed by an organization called Broadway. Broadway and 6W0XQJR¶V merged in April 
2014 (http://www.0XQJR¶Vsbroadway.org.uk/about/history, accessed 29th April, 2014). 
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EHFDXVH DWWULEXWLRQ RI RXWFRPH WR WKH VHUYLFH SURYLGHU¶V DFWLRQV ZDV critical to their entitlement to 
payment (as it is in all payment-for-results contracts, whether in a traditional economic setting or in a 
social setting like this one) and also because the rationality of the SIB is to target St 0XQJR¶V activities at 
LQGLYLGXDOV UDWKHU WKDQ ³VRFLHW\´. Baselines are fundamentally important because they provide the 
analysis of what is expected to happen without a specific (targeted) intervention. By linking payments to 
results beyond the baseline expectations, the achievement of outcomes is incentivised (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2014). 
7KH&+$,1GDWDEDVHZDV WKH VRXUFHRI LPSRUWDQW³IHDVLELOLW\ FULWHULD´ IRU6,%V It produced a 
well-defined target population that could not be manipulated by the service provider, and accordingly 
reduce the potential for µFUHDPVNLPPLQJ¶that is, the potential for the service provider to focus on those 
individuals considered the easiest to help, thereby leaving the most vulnerable unaided (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2014, p. 21). There are three basic categories of homelessness in 
the CHAIN database ± those who have just started sleeping rough, who may or may not quickly return to 
more stable housing situations; those who are chronic rough sleepers, who may have multiple issues such 
as mental illness or drug dependency; and a middle group, the so-FDOOHG³,QEHWZHHQHUV´ who have had 
multiple separate episodes of rough sleeping related to various underlying ³SUREOHPV´, but who have not 
yet been labelled as chronic. This categorization shows that all those in the database are assessed and 
objectified according to a series of measurements. The focus of the SIB, would only be on the 
Inbetweeners. 12  All of the Inbetweeners on CHAIN would be included in the bond. During the 
development of the bond the number of Inbetweeners rose from 653 (the number in the initial business 
case) to 830. 
                                                     
12 7KHZRUG³,QEHWZHHQHUV´DOOXGHVWRDSRSXODUWHOHYLVLRQVKRZLQWKH8., where it refers to individuals between 
childhood and adulthood. In this situation comedy, dysfunctional adolescents are considered laughable. The 
connotations are therefore pejorative for anyone familiar with the show. 
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There is a biopolitical element to the database itself.13 That is, collecting data and monitoring the 
life choices and circumstances of the homeless individuals becomes increasingly important, not only to 
doing the monitoring, but also to creating the conditions for other programmes (like the SIB) to alter the 
lives of clients. By such technologies, the structure of the field itself is altered to conform to a neoliberal 
YHUVLRQRIZKDWLVFRQVLGHUHG³FRUUHFW´. 
The CHAIN data base was important for developing the business case for the London Homeless 
SIB (Social Finance, 2012b) and the Navigator Model was promoted in it as the best direction for future 
spending. Once the outline business case was in place, a process of negotiation amongst a range of 
institutions and organizations began. 
Negotiations 
The St 0XQJR¶V staff we interviewed said that the LQLWLDO EXVLQHVV FDVH FRQWDLQHG WKH ³NLQG RI
ideas that a non-H[SHUW RQ KRPHOHVVQHVV ZRXOG FRPH XS ZLWK´ DQG WKDW WKH RXWFRPHV EHFDPH PRUH
realistic after negotiations had taken place. 
Detailed analysis was performed on three key, inter-related economic variables. First, what 
specific results could be achieved with this ³,QEHWZHHQHUV´ cohort of homeless clients? This meant 
identifying particular aspects of their homelessness that clients FRXOG ³ZRUN RQ´, such as health, 
education. Second, given these potential results, what types of payments could be offered to the service 
provider as incentives to reach desired targets? And third, given these payments, what cost savings, if any, 
could accrue to the traditional payer in this field, the UK government (specifically, the DCLG)? The 
specification of targets and the distribution of incentives was the subject of intense negotiation between 
the service providers, their social finance advisors and the Greater London Authority. 
St 0XQJR¶V staff said that they basically worked out what they could achieve with the money that 
might eventually be paid at the end of the SIB. Again, the technologies of accounting were central to this 
                                                     
13 There are several different types of information recorded on the data base: (a) basic identifying and demographic 
information, (b) contacts made with outreach workers, both when a person is 'bedded down' and when they are not 
'bedded down', (c) arrivals and departures from short term accommodation such as hostels, including the reasons for 
departures, and (d) basic indications of support needs people have, such as drug misuse or physical health problems. 
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process enabling a form of production efficiency calculation, except the products in this case are human 
beings. Eventually, firm outcome metrics were incorporated into the business case for the SIB. 
Payment by Results: Outcome Metrics 
Outcome metrics form the foundation of the SIB contract, and link the various institutions and 
agents in ways that are different than under prior forms of funding. Their importance to the feasibility of 
the SIB instrument is outlined below: 
The most important criteria for any outcome metric is whether it incentivises a service that 
ultimately improves outcomes for those who use it. In addition, when making the value-for-
PRQH\DUJXPHQW«LWLVKHOSIXOWROLQNVXFKDPHWULFWRFDVKDEOHVDYLQJVRQWKHSDUWRIWKH
public sector commissioner. « The key is to identify an outcome metric which is measurable 
and objective. There must be a willing funder to pay if outcomes are delivered. Whether or 
not suitable metrics can be identified is a key determinant of whether or not a SIB is the 
appropriate instrument for addressing an identified social need. (Social Finance, 2013c, p. 11) 
The SIB contract included five outcome metrics aligned with the key aims of the programme, 
whose payments were weighted as follows: 
Table 1: Outcome metrics and payment weights 
Goal Metric Weight 
Primary outcomes   
Reducing rough sleeping Reduction in the number of individuals with bedded down 
contacts in London beyond a baseline. 
25% 
Supporting clients into 
stable accommodation 
Confirmed sustainment of non-hostel tenancy for up to 18 
months, with no more than one bedded down street contact in 
London in any one six month period. 
40% 
Supporting clients into 
sustained reconnection to a 
country where they enjoy 
local connections 
Confirmed reconnection to a destination outside of the UK with 
no bedded down street contact in London in the following six 
months. 
25% 
Secondary outcomes   
Supporting client progress 
towards employment 
Increase the number of individuals 
x Achieving NQF level 2 or equivalent qualification 
x Sustaining volunteering or self employment 
x Sustaining part time employment 
x Sustaining employment 
5% 
Supporting clients to better 
manage their health 
Improvement above a baseline of the number of A&E episodes 
per year 
5% 
Source: ³&RQWUDFWIRU6HUYLFHVEHWZHHQWKH*UHDWHU/RQGRQ$XWKRULW\DQG>1DPHRI6HUYLFH3URYLGHU@´S
(Obtained by authors through a Freedom of Information Request) 
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As explained earlier, organisations in the sector commented on successive drafts of, and 
amendments to, the Social Finance business case, and the GLA made adjustments. For instance, one of 
WKH PHWULFV LQ WKH 6,% ZRXOG EH IRU ³UHFRQQHFWLRQ´ enabling people to return to the countries their 
country of origin). The fee for reconnection was considered to be insufficient by the organisations 
commenting on the Social Finance business case, and so it was increased. Although the weightings and 
goals were the outcome of negotiations, the weighted distribution reveal the importance placed on 
different outcomes. St. 0XQJR¶V was tasked (and rewarded) primarily with removing individuals from the 
street; this is reflected in the three primary outcome measurements. 
The third metric ³Supporting clients into sustained reconnection to a country where they enjoy 
local connections´ DOWKRXJK FDUHIXOO\ ZRUGHG UHIOHFWV WKH QDWXUH RI WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ KRPHOHVV
demographic and political attitudes towards them. Fifty-two per cent of rough sleepers are now non-UK 
citizens (Fitzpatrick, Pawson, Bramley, & Wilcox, 2011, p. 58). Twenty-eight per cent of homeless on the 
CHAIN database are from European Union Countries (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2012) and are entitled to UK state benefits. Reconnection measurements are included in the 
contract to encourage St 0XQJR¶V to help these Inbetweeners return to their country of origin. The 
contract requires St 0XQJR¶V to have staff travel with the participant to their country of origin and work to 
ensure they get access to appropriate support there. According to the official documentation, St 0XQJR¶V 
VWDIIZLOOQRW³ZDONDZD\´XQWLOWKH\DUHVXUHWKHSDUWLFLSDQWis likely to remain outside the UK. 
The fourth and fifth measures are weighted considerably less. The fourth measure related to 
connecting the individuals to employment, volunteer work, education, or training. An interviewee said 
that during the initial meeting, there was a feeling that this would be the most difficult measure to 
achieve. The fifth goal can be directly linked to attempts by the government to cut the costs of public 
services. Core government research (Department of Health, 2010) suggested the cost of the homeless to 
the National Health Service is considerable. Homeless people are 3.2 times more likely than the general 
population to be an in-patient admission, and cost 1.5 times more (Department of Health, 2010). Since the 
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majority of homeless people lack a general practitioner, their access to health care is through Accident 
and Emergency (A&E), consequently, they are six times more likely to attend A&E (Mathie, 2013). 
These outcome metrics include and are based on several neoliberal ideals. As noted with the 
Navigator Model, the use of multiple outcome metrics means that attention must necessarily be focused 
on LQGLYLGXDOLVHG³UHVXOWV´DQGQRWRQDQ\ specific social service. The outcome metrics also reflect the 
neoliberal notion of human capital. This technology, inserted into this social space, is fundamentally 
about working on the human capital of each client in the cohort, so that they may increase that capital on 
the path to employability and self-sufficiency or, failing this, serve as a reserve army of labour (Foucault, 
1978, 2008). Improving human capital through interventions at the micro level of social life, as noted by 
Foucault, is fundamental to a society that has taken as its aim the more general improvement of the 
human capital: 
And as soon as a society poses itself the problem of the improvement of its human capital in 
general, it is inevitable that the problem of the control, screening, and improvement of the 
KXPDQFDSLWDORILQGLYLGXDOV«ZLOOEHFRPHDFWXDORUDWDQ\UDWHFDOOHGIRU(Foucault, 2008, 
p. 228) 
The final consideration in the process of constructing the SIB contract payment by results metrics 
was the value for money calculation. This will be considered next. 
The Role of Cost Determination 
The outcome metrics identified in the prior section entered into the value-for-money calculation. 
In general, this calculation takes into account all the prospective payments by the commissioner if the 
outcome measures are achieved. Social Finance, the technical consulting advisor, considers the following 
factors: 
x Current costs to government of a particular target population 
x Costs of a proposed SIB intervention 
x Estimated impact of proposed intervention 
x Potential cost savings to commissioner(s) 
x Estimate of investor returns  
(Social Finance, 2013c, p. 19) 
23 
Government and other research suggest that the annual cost to the government of an individual 
homeless person is between £24,000 and £30,000 (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2012) or £1 billion in aggregate (National Audit Office, 2005). The initial SIB business case for the 653 
³Inbetweeners´ RQ WKH &+$,1 GDWDEDVH based its public sector resource usage estimates on the cost 
measurements shown in column 3 of Table 2 (Social Finance, 2012b, p. 30). The alternative cost 
measures that were not used, shown in column 4, are informative. The majority of them relate to more 
traditional programmes designed to bring about social change, or are traditional VWDWH³VRFLDOOHYHUV´ For 
example, health costs are based upon hospital usage and not on specific alcohol and drug treatment 
programmes. The technologies and assumptions related to the calculations are also interesting. The cost 
estimates use WKH³DYHUDJHQHWSUHVHQWYDOXH´calculation featured in all state privatisations, a calculative 
technology that has been shown to be deeply flawed (Cooper & Taylor, 2005).  
Table 2: Costs per individual cohort member across proposed outcome areas 
Costs 
Cost estimate 
used in model Based on 
Cost estimates not 
used in model  
Average NPV 
of costs over 
five years 
Rough sleeping £1,664 x Outreach services x Housing benefit 
uptake 
£2,985 
Accommodation £3,818 x Temporary 
accommodation/ 
x Tenancy breakdowns 
x Changes in housing 
benefit 
£6,849 
Criminal justice £10,693 x Reconviction costs/ 
x Police time 
x Probation costs 
x Long-term 
imprisonment 
£19,182 
Employment £2,600 x -REVHHNHU¶VDOORZDQFH 
x Employment support 
allowance 
x Exchequer benefit 
from employment 
£4,664 
Health £1,890 x Unplanned hospital 
usage 
x Psychiatric hospital 
usage 
x Specific alcohol 
and drug treatment 
programmes 
£3,390 
Average per person  £20,000   £37,000 
Total for cohort £13.5m   £24.2m 
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government (2014) and Social Finance (2012b, p. 30) 
Cost estimates were thus critical to the development and existence of the SIB. The ability to 
reduce the uncertainty of an entire cohort of individuals to a single average net present value produces 
one of the conditions necessary for the SIB to function. The bureaucratic systems of the GLA/DCLG 
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depended on this form of analysis; and the investors UHTXLUHG ³GDWD´ in a form amenable to their own 
financial analysis, so that they could assess the risk of these results not materializing (e.g. by changing the 
discount rate used in the NPV analysis, by calculating ranges of uncertainty around the numbers, by 
pulling out fixed and variable costs, and so on). The data collected on the individuals in the cohort is thus 
constitutive, as it is used to construct the solution. 
We see the laying of a grid of economic analysis (discounted cash flows, interest rates, cost 
DOORFDWLRQ PHWKRGV ULVN DVVHVVPHQWV RQWR D VRFLDO ILHOG WKH KRPHOHVV LQGLYLGXDO¶V PRYHPHQW WKURXJK
OLIH WKXV FUHDWLQJ  QHZ LQGLYLGXDO ³HQWHUSULVLQJ XQLWV´ and/or investment opportunities. The 830 
could be conceived as an investment portfolio, with each individual carrying their own level of risk. In a 
similar way to accounting serving the Nazi war machine (Funnel, 1998), the accounting metrics 
underpinning the SIB seem to efface the concern for human dignity and happiness. Moreover, a careful 
DQDO\VLV RI WKH ERQG VXJJHVWV WKDW LW ZLOO QRW LQWHUIHUH ZLWK ³PDUNHW PHFKDQLVPV´ For example, a 
homeless person may be encouraged to take up the tenancy of non-hostel accommodation ± but the rental 
cost or provision of the accommodation is not be controlled in any way by the state. 
In summary, financial economic analysis is the focal point of the SIB. Economic technologies 
were applied at every turn, making the accounting technologies that produced the requisite data, and that 
structured the relationships between actors, central to SIBs. From the initial budget allocation of the 
public sector commissioner of the SIB through to the development of the performance metrics, business 
plans, value for money calculations, and the due diligence on potential service providers (see Appendix 
2), accounting was instrumental. It played the pivotal role of being the method to determine the 
profitability of the project (crucial to attracting investors) as it incorporated the life circumstances of the 
homeless into its methodologies. But, DFFRXQWLQJ¶V role is not confined to a technical one ± it holds the 
potential to restructure the field and to change the mentalities and practices of the actors within it. We can 
see this in the process to award the SIB, which we discuss next. 
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The Award of the SIB 
Once the business case was in place, the GLA (the bond commissioner) and its advisors followed 
WKHWUDGLWLRQDO8.SULYDWL]DWLRQµ&RPSHWLWLYH'LDORJXH¶SURFHVVWRFRPPLVVLRQWKH6,%7KLVSURFHVVLV
VXSSRVHGWRVROLFLW³KLJKTXDOLW\´WHQGHUVVKRUWOLVWLQJWKRVHZLWKWKHFDSDFLW\DQGFDSDELOLWy to deliver the 
contract. The commissioners issued a detailed proposal to the shortlisted providers, with five weeks for 
submissions building. Four tenders were received. The commissioners judged them on the scale of 
outcomes proposed and the discount provided on the maximum tariffs (the amount paid per outcome). 
They also judged the proposed delivery models in qualitative terms ± for example, ³DPELWLRQ RI WKH
SURYLGHUV WR DFKLHYH RXWFRPHV´ (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2014, p. viii) ± 
and attempted to balance the achievability of the outcomes in each model with their value for money. 
They consulted informally with other GLA stakeholders, local authorities and homeless service providers. 
The GLA received several bids and eventually narrowed the field to two. As detailed earlier, the SIB was 
split into two halves, one going to St 0XQJR¶V and one to Thames Reach. 
In this stage of the SIB we can observe a strikingly neoliberal mentality at play. Service providers 
to the homeless must bid for inclusion, thus limiting the field to those who are economically competitive, 
who are skilful at cost analysis (for determining the discount off the maximum tariff and the value for 
money), and who exhibit an entrepreneurial spirit. Those successful in the bid would receive funding for 
programmes, a determinant in their future viability. The constitutive role of the development process is 
apparent as it shapes the field to disadvantage those unable to fit within this model, either by capacity or 
mentality. Future success, dependent upon present success, was constituted by the way that providers 
were shortlisted at this early stage. In the next section we examine how an array of institutions and 
individuals were (re)structured around the SIB. 
THE SIB ACTORS 
We now move on to critically examine the network of social institutions and agents that are 
brought together in new ways via the SIB instrument. The agents will be categorised (as per Figure 1) as 
26 
the delivery agency and service provider (St. 0XQJR¶V), the Payer (DCLG), the Commissioner (GLA), the 
Intermediaries (Social Finance and Triodos Bank), the Investors (Venturesome, Orp Foundation, two 
private investors and St Mungo) and the Target Group (³,nbetweenerV´). 
St 0XQJR¶V 
St 0XQJR¶V is a London-based charity with a history of service to the poor. It was founded in 
1969 with a soup run. St 0XQJR¶V operates in an extremely chaotic and harrowing social space. This is in 
SDUWGXHWRWKH³FOLHQWHOH´LWVHUYHVPDQ\RIZKRPVXIIHUIURPFRPSOH[SUREOems of mental illness, failed 
family relationships, alcoholism and drug abuse and in part, due to the insecure nature of its funding. St 
0XQJR¶V has a history of innovations in service. For example, it has allowed dogs and alcohol in its 
premises and given residents a private room with their own key while other charities and the state 
provided grim dormitory accommodation. It has set up a Sanctuary for elderly homeless people, designed 
to be as non-institutional as possible. It has provided opportunities for skill development, psychiatric and 
drug rehabilitation, and decent food. The activities and innovations of St 0XQJR¶V thus reflect a case-
based approach to dealing with the homeless XQGHUSLQQHGE\DEHOLHILQ³VRFLDOLQWHUYHQWLRQV´. 
The usual practice for helping the homeless has been for outreach workers to build connections 
with people very gradually. The homeless are in the main very vulnerable and distrusting. Outreach 
workers are skilled at reaching out to them and winning their trust. This is a slow process. At first, the 
worker may just go and sit near someone in a companionable way, moving on to a few words, offering a 
drink, painstakingly building up a relationship. Only when trust is established will an attempt be made to 
introduce a homeless person to some form of accommodation. However, under traditional forms of 
outreach, if the accommodation provided by the local authority, St 0XQJR¶V, or an alternative provider, is 
on the outskirts of London, the homeless person can lose contact with their outreach worker. This was 
supposed to change with the introduction of the SIB Navigator Model. 
The organisation grew through traditional government funding and charitable donations. By 
2014, St 0XQJR¶V had a turnover of £53.8m (2013: £48.9m; 2012: £48.2m) and employed 1,131 (2013: 
984; 2012: 956) full-time-equivalent staff (St Mungo's, 2013). In 2014, St 0XQJR¶V raised £6.57 million 
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in charitable donations (2013: £5.63m; 2012: £5.16m). The cost of raising these donations was £3.20 
million (2013: £2.62m; 2012: £2.25m). In 2014, 12% of St 0XQJR¶V turnover was from charitable 
donations. The bulk of the turnover derives from various state sources ± grants from Local Authorities, 
the Homes and Communities Agency, and other Government departments. A significant source of state 
support comes through the ³6XSSRUWLQJ3HRSOH´LQLWLDWLYHVHWXSEy the New Labour government in 2003. 
In the 2011 spending review, the Chancellor cut 12% of the Supporting People funding over four years, 
putting significant financial pressure on St 0XQJR¶V (St Mungo's, 2013, p. 2). In short, St 0XQJR¶V is a 
charity almost totally dependent on state financing. 
We identified nine state-contracts ranging from £200,000 to £70 million (a multi-year contract 
shared with other organisations) awarded to St 0XQJR¶V between 2009 and 2012 inclusive. These 
contracts are staggeringly large by the standards of many homelessness programmes. St 0XQJR¶V now 
also invites tenders for others to provide it with services, including, in 2011, tenders for a neutral vendor 
management service of temporary and locum staff, an applicant tracker system, renovation of one of its 
hostels, and the supply of its electricity and gas. The latter contract was awarded on the basis of lowest-
price criteria. The mentality needed for competitive contracting was thus already present in the way St 
0XQJR¶V itself operates. Importantly, this positioned it to be successful in the bidding process for future 
contracts, including the SIB. 
While St 0XQJR¶V has had success in winning contracts, the nature of the competitive market 
means that it does not always win the bids it enters. Competition with corporate for-profit organizations 
also increases the need to adopt an economic mentality in approaching funding issues. For example, in 
2011, voluntary organisations that help young people into jobs were being frozen out of the government's 
£5 billion Work Programme (Butler, 2011). The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) chose 18 
contractors to provide 40 work programmes in 2011. Only two were voluntary bodies, despite ministerial 
pledges that charities would get a large portion of the work. Most charitable organisations were unable to 
meet the initial criteria of an annual turnover of £20 million and the cash-flow capacity to fulfil large 
contracts. St 0XQJR¶V, one of the largest players in the sector, claims it has been awarded no contracts 
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under the Work Programme, apart from one where there have actually been no clients (Sherman, 2011). 
In the accounting year 2010/11, St 0XQJR¶V stated that: 
 ZH EHJDQ GLVFXVVLQJ ZLWK RXU VWDII DQG XQLRQ KRZ WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ FDQ EH ³ILW IRU WKH
IXWXUH´ DQG VXUYLYH WKH FXWV EHLQJ LPSRVHGRQXVE\ERWK FHQWUDO DQG ORFDO JRYHUQPHQW In 
April 2011 we negotiated an agreement to change terms and conditions, which includes 
increasing the working week by two and a half hours at no extra costs. (St Mungo's, 2012a) 
Such statements indicate a sense of being in survival mode, not just amongst managers but 
amongst staff as well, who agreed to employment contract concessions. But as can be seen from Table 3, 
the contract concessions were not enough to stave off job cuts in 2012. Furthermore, while in 2013 there 
was a small increase in staff numbers of 2.9%, average salaries fell by 2%.14 The 2014 accounts show that 
while there has been a significant increase in the number of staff (15%), average wages are now lower in 
nominal terms than in 2009 (15.4% lower in real terms).15 
Table 3 - Employment Levels at St 0XQJR¶V 
Employee Information 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 # FTE # FTE # FTE # FTE # FTE # FTE 
Full time 720 720 791 791 797 797 704 704 721 721 766 766 
Part time 91 47 87 61 102 61 139 86 146 89 187 171 
Locum 222 172 234 171 227 161 240 166 245 174 266 194 
Total  939  1,023  1,019  956  984  1,131 
% change  -  +9%  -0.4%  -6.2%  +2.9%  +15% 
Total salary  £26.7m  £29.3m  £29.8m  £28.1m  £28.4m  £30.9m 
Avg. salary  £28,442  £28,636  £29,195  £29,430  £28,833  £27,290 
% change    +0.6%  +2%  +0.8%  -2%  -5.4% 
Source: Compiled from St 0XQJR¶V Annual Reports. (FTE = full time equivalent) 
St 0XQJR¶V overall financial situation, as shown in their financial statements prior to the receipt 
of funding from the London Homelessness SIB, was one of cuts to core funding, having to dip into the 
reserve fund to pay for fixed assets, overreliance on a single government source, and job insecurity. 
Indeed, the St 0XQJR¶V staff we interviewed seemed to be dominated by the need to bring in revenue. The 
move to try out a radical new form of funding is understandable in view of its budgetary challenges. 
                                                     
14 In December 2013, VWDIIDWRQHRI6W0XQJR¶VKRVWHOVZHQWRQVWULNHRYHUWKHSD\DQGFRQGLWLRQVRIILYHSURMHFW
ZRUNHUVZKRVHSD\DQGFRQGLWLRQVZHUHZRUVHWKDQ6W0XQJR¶VUHJXODUVWDII 
15 According to Government Retail Price Indices (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/data-
selector.html?cdid=CHAW&dataset=mm23&table-id=2.1). 
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David Evans, Finance Director for St 0XQJR¶VLVTXRWHGDVVD\LQJWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUSURILWZDVDQ³DGGHG
DWWUDFWLRQ ZKHQ VRFLDO SURWHFWLRQ IXQGLQJ LV VKULQNLQJ´ (GreenFutures, 2013). Our Triodos interviewee 
also indicated that St 0XQJR¶V could earn as much as £300,000 in profit on the SIB. In this way, St. 
0XQJR¶V learns to incorporate profit-oriented analysis into its organization. 
As a proportion of St 0XQJR¶V overall turnover, the maximum pay-out of £2.4 million achievable 
by the SIB is quite small (less than 5%). Moreover, this money was costly for St 0XQJR¶V to raise and 
administer. We were told that if St 0XQJR¶V had chosen to raise £2.4 million from donors, then £2.05 
million of that amount would be spent on the front line and £0.35 million on raising the funds and 
administration. With the SIB, only £1.8 million will be spent on the front line. What is uncertain is 
whether and to what extent traditional forms of state funding will continue to exist. This uncertainty 
provides an incentive for St. 0XQJR¶V to participate in the SIB, and having developed the necessary 
expertise with SIBs, St 0XQJR¶V might have an additional incentive to demand more funding of this type, 
since it will have first-mover advantages over other service providers. 
In accepting the SIB funding, St 0XQJR¶V found it necessary to adopt a new corporate structure. It 
was our interviewee at Triodos Bank who told us St 0XQJR¶V set up the wholly-owned special purpose 
vehicle mentioned above, Street Impact Ltd, on the award of the SIB. One of the features of the SIB was 
the need to raise funds from investors. St 0XQJR¶V preference would have been to provide its own 
working capital (which it did to a large extent); the requirement to take on loans brought an added layer of 
financial risk to St 0XQJR¶V. It could be that St 0XQJR¶V hoped to take advantage of the limited liability 
of Street Impact Ltd in the event that it was unable to repay the loans or the interest on them. 
The SIB has meant that there is increased surveillance embedded into St 0XQJR¶V. St 0XQJR¶V 
had to make room for a new staff person representing the investors, whose job is to manage and monitor 
the performance measurements. Some of St 0XQJR¶V activities are now carefully audited by the GLA. 
In summary, St 0XQJR¶V is an organisation that derives the majority of its funding from the state 
and is thus vulnerable to cuts in government expenditure. It also is in a social space dominated by 
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financially powerful corporations, such as Serco (2014 turnover £3,955m),16 with whom it will have to 
compete for government contracts. In this respect, the decision to bid for the SIB could be seen less as an 
ideological embrace of the biopolitical mentalities embedded within the bond than simply the opportunity 
to develop a new income stream. Nonetheless, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the 
ways in which the bond will impact upon St 0XQJR¶V staff, it is possible to observe the creation of 
individual entrepreneurial units in St 0XQJR¶V, the navigators ZKRVHMREVGHSHQGXSRQWKH³VXFFHVV´RI
the SIB. It is also possible to see the development of a more individualised approach to the homeless. The 
navigators will ³work on´ specific individuals and the success of the bond will depend upon them living 
in tenanted accommodation or moving to their country of origin, not on them tackling their substance 
abuse or other problems. There is nothing within the SIB to deal with the significant social problems that 
underpin homelessness in London. 
The Payer: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
Our interviews suggest that the collective forces of the state were mobilised to support the bond. 
This included high level meetings at Admiralty House and at Clarence House. The latter is the official 
residence of the Prince of Wales, who we were told was present at one of the SIB meetings. These 
meetings were attended by the staff from Social Finance Ltd, by lawyers and accountants, and by 
representatives of (surprisingly few) charities, one of which was St 0XQJR¶V. One of our interviewees 
said the story EHLQJ WROG DW WKHVH PHHWLQJV ZDV WKDW ³6,%V DUH WKH IXWXUH´ Also, an interviewee at St. 
0XQJR¶V indicated that the D&/*IRFXVZDVRQWKH³IODYRXURIWKHPRQWK´DVSHFWRIWKH6,%FRQFHSWDQG
RQWKHIDFWWKDWWKHKRPHOHVVQHVVJURXSZHUHDQ³LQWHUHVWLQJJURXS´WRWU\VRPHWKLQJRXWZLWKVLQFHLWZDV
difficult to maintain life off of the street. A GLA LQWHUYLHZHH VDLG WKDW LWZDVQ¶W FOHDU WKH*/$ZRXOG
KDYHVHWXSWKHERQGLIWKHPRQH\KDGQ¶WFRPHIURPWKH&DELQHW2IILFH 
The dominant rationality for SIBs heralded by the state is that they will transfer the financial risk 
of running programmes onto the provider because the state will only have to pay for successful outcomes. 
                                                     
16 Serco 2014 Annual Report. 
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)LJXUHLV6RFLDO)LQDQFH¶VGLDJUDPRIWKis feature of SIBs.17 Although the government will not have the 
contractual obligation of paying for an unsuccessful SIB, the failure of SIBs will be felt by the most 
vulnerable in society to the detriment of society as a whole. In Figure 2, social or humanitarian risk is 
unacknowledged. 
Figure 2 
 
Source: Social Finance (2012b, p. 24) 
In addition to reducing the risk to government, SIBs are promoted as producing cost savings. A 
schematic illustration of potential cost savings of an SIB is shown in Figure 3, demonstrating how SIBs 
are portrayed to payers (and other stakeholders). In the fLJXUHWKH³SRWHQWLDOFRVWVDYLQJ´LVUHWDLQHGE\
Government as payer. Reducing the SIB arrangement (and the underlying social complexities it is meant 
to address) to bar charts, in order to visually represent the notion of cost savings and risk transfer, is a key 
means to communicate and characterize SIBs as an idealized solution. 
                                                     
17 It is noteworthy that both procurement methods involve best value for money calculations and private sector 
suppliers. The state provision of public services is not within this frame of reference. 
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Figure 3: Cost saving schematic 
 
Source: Social Finance (2013c, p. 18) 
The UK central government has promoted SIBs on the basis that they will produce cost savings 
and reduce the financial risk of the state. A deeper analysis suggests that there is much more at play. SIBs 
are a vehicle through which market mechanisms can be brought closer to government. Arguably, they 
leave market mechanisms and individual entrepreneurial units (navigators) to deal with difficult social 
problems like homelessness. Currently, UK SIBs are targeted at the most vulnerable and least powerful; 
however, in the future they could come to replace other state social policies and interventions (or levers of 
government). The next section will briefly consider the arm of government tasked with commissioning 
the SIB, the GLA. 
The Commissioner: GLA 
The Greater London Authority, when the SIB was being put together, was operating in a climate 
of intensified public concern about homelessness. This was around the time of the 2012 London Olympic 
Games. In 2011, the Mayor had secured £34 million to end rough sleeping by 2012 (Greater London 
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Authority, 2011), and led a campaign to clean up London that was criticised as a veiled attack on people 
using public spaces (Boyes, 2012).18  
The GLA was the body that decided which charity/charities should be awarded the SIB. The open 
procurement (µ&RPSHWLWLYH 'LDORJXH¶) process enabled the GLA to refine the price at which service 
providers would work with the homeless cohort on an outcomes basis. Akin to central government, the 
GLA promoted the SIB as a means to transfer financial risk from the state, reduce costs and increase 
innovation. Yet, an interviewee from the GLA said that one of the unsuccessful bids did not succeed 
³EHFDXVHRILWVLQQRYDWLRQ´PHDQLQJLWVDSSURDFKZDs considered too risky. This suggests a certain risk 
aversion related to the services funded by SIBs, which is paradoxical because the SIB concept has been 
touted as promoting innovation and entrepreneurial risk-taking. <HW LW DOVR H[HPSOLILHV WKH */$¶V
entrepreneurial neoliberal analysis of risk and reward. Viewed under a market-oriented conceptualization 
of risk being in proportion to reward, it is understandable that certain innovations would be deemed to be 
WRR³ULVN\´, in the sense that insufficient reward was available relative to returns offered elsewhere in the 
³PDUNHW´, that is, by the other providers vying for participation. The GLA may also have been concerned 
ZLWK WKH ³LQYHVWRU´ HOHPHQW RI 6,%V: it might be difficult to have attracted investors for very risky 
programmes. 
In its decision to award two SIBs, the GLA might also be seen as acting with a market mentality. 
Thames Reach and St 0XQJR¶V could be compared with each other. And by awarding two SIBs, the GLA 
could have been attempting to diversify its risk. 
The GLA audits the bond¶s performance metrics and makes payments under the bond. The 
auditing aspect of the bond threw up a small paradox. The CHAIN database is not an independent source 
of information because it is updated by the service providers themselves, including St 0XQJR¶V and 
Thames Reach. In 2014, St 0XQJR¶V merged with Broadway, the organisation that maintains CHAIN. In 
effect, St 0XQJR¶V now owns the database used to audit St 0XQJR¶V. 
                                                     
18 In 2007, the UN-funded Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) published a report into the effects of 
Olympic Games on property and homeless between 1988 and 2008. The report found that Olympic Games 
exacerbated the effects of homelessness. 
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In its handling of the London Homelessness SIB, the GLA itself thus acted in an 
entrepreneurial/neoliberal ± that is, self-interested ± way. Nonetheless, our GLA interviewees (solicitor 
and auditor) were each individually committed to helping the homeless. In this respect they mirrored our 
St 0XQJR¶V interviewees. Their dominant concern appeared to be less with the market ideology of the 
bond than with the potential £5m of additional funding for the homeless. Next we turn to the investors. 
The Investors: St 0XQJR¶V, CAF Venturesome, Orp Foundation, and Private Investors 
Building on initial consultations with social investors, Social Finance circulated information 
about the SIB, once funding had been secured by DCLG. Social Finance also met with each of the short-
listed providers to discuss investor expectations. The short-listed providers then attended a pre-arranged 
µ0DUNHW ,QIRUPDWLRQ'D\.¶Follow-up with investors after the event was performed differently by each 
provider (as discussed in the next section on intermediaries). 
,QVSLWHRI6RFLDO)LQDQFH¶VHIIRUWVSt 0XQJR¶V became the largest investor in its own SIB. As 
mentioned, it set up a wholly owned subsidiary called Street Impact Ltd., paying in £237,000 share 
capital. Alongside the St 0XQJR¶V investment, four investors agreed to loan £650,000 funds in total. The 
most recent accounts indicate that these investors have loaned a total of £400,000 to St 0XQJR¶V (via 
Street Impact). Two of the investors, the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) Venturesome and the Orp 
Foundation, are charities. The other two investors DUH³KLJKQHWZRUWK´LQGLYLGXDOV However, the majority 
of the investment is being made by the three charities, including St 0XQJR¶V. 
The investors are paid 6.5% annual interest rate on a quarterly basis, with the principal sum 
repaid after the end of the contract once all potential sustained outcomes have been achieved. The rate of 
return has not officially been reported in government reports due to commercial confidentiality; but it is 
UHSRUWHG LQ 6WUHHW ,PSDFW /WG¶V $QQXDO 5HSRUW DQG WKLV DPRXQW ZDV FRQILUPHG E\ RXU 7ULRGRV %DQN
interviewee. Our interviewees at the GLA disputed this interest rate. They said that Social Finance 
consistently told them the interest UDWHRQWKH6,%ZRXOGKDYHWREH³YHU\KLJK´DQGWKRXJKWWKHUDWHPXVW
be at least 12%. High rates of return were a feature of earlier SIBs. 
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It is interesting that two senior GLA employees involved with the bond were unaware of the 
interest rate, and indeed, unaware that St 0XQJR¶V had set up a separate limited company to carry the debt 
of the SIB. In addition, an interviewee at St 0XQJR¶V offered a different interpretation of the interest 
payments, saying that if St 0XQJR¶V achieved its base performance targets, the bondholders would get 
their principal back, but that receiving interest was contingent on St 0XQJR¶V hitting its higher 
performance targets. These different interpretations may only indicate the newness of the concept and 
lack of standard features in the bonds. Alternatively, they may indicate that the formation of financial 
habitus at St 0XQJR¶V is incomplete, or that the conceptual terrain for social impact bonds is contested. 
In the next section we discuss the role of the intermediaries who IDFLOLWDWHGWKH6W0XQJR¶V6,%. 
The Intermediaries: Social Finance and Triodos Bank 
Intermediaries have emerged as a fundamental part of the network around the SIB technology. It 
is important to recognise the mechanisms by which SIBs, as a technology and a governance meme, have 
been propagated. One evident mechanism is the influence of consultants on governments. For example, 
the UK Cabinet Office website on SIBs provides templates for commissioners who are attempting to 
follow the lead of the Cabinet Office and initiate their own social impact bonds (Inside Government, 
2013). The templates include a how-WRJXLGHDQGDQH[DPSOHRID³SRWHQWLDOVDYLQJV´VSUHDGVKHHWWKDWFDQ
be adapted to justify the introduction of SIBs into a field of social policy. The templates have, alongside 
those of the Cabinet Office, the name and logo of ³ATQ Consultants´ in their page headings. ATQ 
Consultants is a small firm staffed by three people with public sector and business development 
experience (ATQ Consultants, 2013). 
In the London Homelessness SIB, two intermediaries played central roles in the development and 
implementation of the agreement. These were Social Finance Ltd. and Triodos Bank. Social Finance is a 
consulting firm that actively promotes SIBs as a public policy solution. At first, it was only active in the 
UK, but now is expanding its influence around the globe. Although the firm lists representatives of the 
charitable foundation of the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and of the UK Charity Commission on its 
board, most of its board members come from hedge funds, global finance firms, and major banks (Social 
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Finance, 2013a). Founded in 2007 by Toby EcclesSUHYLRXVO\WKHVHFUHWDULDWRIWKH8.¶V&RPPLVVLRQRQ
Unclaimed Assets, the company is now headed by a former investment banker (Social Finance, 2013b). 
Like Triodos Bank, Social Finance states on its website that it is authorised and regulated by the Financial 
Services Authority, a defunct entity within the UK government that has now been split into two separate 
regulatory authorities. 
Social Finance was involved from the outset of the London Homelessness SIB, sketching out the 
initial structure, conducting research, enlisting other agents, and developing the cost and delivery models. 
Thus, the mentality that Social Finance takes into this field is shaping the field itself and influencing 
which technologies gain purchase. 
The other important intermediary was Triodos Bank. Triodos became engaged with this SIB in a 
prototypically neoliberal way, through a mutually agreed-upon economic relationship. St. 0XQJR¶V was 
able to avoid the uncertainty of investor follow-up by working with Triodos. Triodos, as an intermediary, 
ZDV QRW D ³QHFHVVDU\´ OLQN LQ WKLV QHWZRUN WKH different providers vying to participate in the London 
Homelessness SIB took up different approaches to following up with potential investors. One model was 
provider-led, whereby providers directly contacted social investors who had attended the Market 
,QIRUPDWLRQ'D\DVNLQJWRPHHW7KH\DOVRFRQWDFWHGLQYHVWRUVZKRKDGQ¶WDWWHQGHG, identified through 
their networks of existing contacts; one provider described their links with investors as being a result of 
µZRUNLQJP\FRQWDFWV ERRNKDUG¶7KHVHFond model was that taken by St 0XQJR¶V, who early on in the 
process, following the Market Information Day, agreed with Triodos Bank that it would act as an 
intermediary. St. 0XQJR¶V was the only provider to engage this type of intermediary. Although Triodos 
held discussions with three of the providers during this early phase, they agreed to work only with St 
0XQJR¶V. Triodos Bank had been enlisted by the GLA in the first half of 2012, and were asked to work 
with a service provider to take the SIB through to launch (Triodos interviewee).19 Triodos evaluated 
                                                     
19 This was confirmed by our interviewees at the GLA, who said that the bond was first proposed by the UK 
Department of Communities and Local Government, under advice by Social Finance. The interviewees also 
indicated that the decision to negotiate terms with Triodos, in order to make them attractive to investors, was a 
GHSDUWXUHIURPWKH*/$¶VQRUPDO³WDNHLWRUOHDYHLW´SURFXUHPHQWSURFHGXUHV 
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potential service providers not just on their track record, proven ability, and level of success in the field, 
EXWDOVRRQWKHEDVLVRIDILQDQFLDODSSUDLVDO,QIDFW7ULRGRV³DOZD\V had one eye on the service provider 
SXWWLQJ LQ VRPH RI WKHLU RZQ FDSLWDO WR HQFRXUDJH RWKHU LQYHVWRUV´ 7ULRGRV LQWHUYLHZHH 7KH\ ZHUH
drawn to St 0XQJR¶V because of its large financial base. The work Triodos put into this phase was crucial 
in assuring potential investors that the project was financially sound. 
For a fixed fee, Triodos were able to prepare the information investors required, liaise with them 
on St 0XQJR¶V behalf and provide support with negotiations. Other providers, working without an agreed 
intermediary, were said to be unsure about the costs associated with this phase of the project. Given that 
St. 0XQJR¶V was the most financially sound provider, this indicates that the financial capital and financial 
sophistication of some providers allows them to access expertise unavailable to others. 
Triodos and St 0XQJR¶V KDG WR ZRUN KDUG RQ WKH ³YDOLGLW\´ RI DOO RI WKH IRUHFDVWV DQG RXWSXW
measurements, according to our Triodos interviewee. They looked at St 0XQJR¶V own historical data, the 
CHAIN database, and other evidence about different types of rough sleepers. This phase of the 
development also involved the bank representatives spending time with St 0XQJR¶V outreach workers. 
Our interviewee said that the outreach workers knew more about the chaQFHRI³VXFFHVV´with homeless 
clients WKDQDQ\RIWKH³ILQDQFHJX\V´DQGLQIDFWKDGVXFKGHHSNQRZOHGJHRIWKHILHOGWKDWWKH\NQHZ
some of the 830-person target group personally. 
Triodos and St 0XQJR¶V also worked together on internal cost estimates and budgeting. They had 
to determine the costs of achieving the specified targets, and therefore how much investment they would 
need to attract through the bond facility. Costs would include staff (the main cost), accommodation, 
infrastructure (especially communications technology like broadband, mobile phones, and so on), 
rehabilitation, medical support, and details like pocket money. An interviewee from St 0XQJR¶V said that 
they put forward a bid as to what they though could be achieved in the areas dictated by Social Finance 
with £2.4 million. This suggests that they worked backwards from the available financial resources to 
determine the performance targets that would make the programme profitable. 
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The key Triodos bank employee involved in the SIB, in an interview, expressed a strong 
FRPPLWPHQWWR³VRFLDOEDQNLQJ´DQGWRKHOSLQJWKHKRPHOHVV When he spoke about the future of SIBs he 
VDLGWKDWLWZRXOGEHEHWWHULIWKHUH³ZHUHPRUHOLTXLGLW\LQWKHPDUNHW´ Thus, while showing a genuine 
concern for the homeless, this banker spoke in clear neoliberal terms. If realised, his desire for a SIB 
market may well complete the financialisation of the state welfare sector. 
Social Finance and Triodos Bank are only two of many organizations promoting SIBs around the 
world. Amongst major consulting firms, McKinsey & Company have prepared videos, booklets, and 
toolkits for organisations contemplating SIBs. Investment banks have also got in on the act, with 
Goldman Sachs particularly active in the United States (Shorthouse, 2012). All of the Big Four global 
accounting firms are prominent promoters of SIBs. Deloitte, particularly in Canada, has jumped on the 
SIB bandwagon with a booklet, entitled Paying for Outcomes (Deloitte, 2012), claiming that SIBs are the 
NH\ WR ³VROYLQJ FRPSOH[ VRFLHWDO LVVXHV´ DQG WKDW WKHUH LV D ³FRPLQJ UHYROXWLRQ LQ VRFLDO SROLF\´
PricewaterhouseCoopers has acted as a technical advisor to Social Finance Ltd (Social Finance, 2011b, 
2011c). Ernst & Young made a major donation and contributed pro bono work to support the Private 
Equity Foundation in developing a social bond related to youth education and training in the UK (Private 
Equity Foundation, 2012). KPMG has been named as a supporter of SIBs in Canada (Curry & Grant, 
2012). 
These activist roles for consulting firms, investment banks and accounting firms, and the speed at 
which SIB schemes are travelling throughout the public sector and across national boundaries, suggest 
that SIBs are not simply permeating into practice passively. They are being promoted actively by global 
business ³FRVPRSROLWDQV´(Briers & Chua, 2001; Kanter, 1995) who, notwithstanding their passion for the 
idea, have economic interests in this technology. They act in a field that is increasingly dominated by a 
neoOLEHUDOPHQWDOLW\VXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHGHVLUHWR³KHOS´LVQRWLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHGHVLUHWR³SURILW´
once an economic grid is overlaid upon a ³WDUJHW SRSXODWLRQ´. The next section is concerned with this 
population. 
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The Target Population: The ³Inbetweeners´ 
Initially, DV VWDWHG HDUOLHU DOO RI WKH ³,QEHWZHHQHUV´RQ WKH &+$,1 GDWDEDVH were individually 
selected, each with a history of repeated rough sleeping and complex issues involving substance abuse, 
mental illness, and/or physical illness. The group grew to 830 during the course of the creation of the SIB. 
Our interviewees at the GLA said that the service providers claimed this increase was unfair, but the GLA 
pointed out that service providers would simply have a bigger pool from which to derive their success 
stories. Certainly, the idea that a specific JURXSRIKRPHOHVVLQGLYLGXDOVZRXOGEH³WUDFNHG´ is not new, 
but the application of specific selection criteria to the CHAIN database represents a means by which 
human capital could be identified, improved, worked on and/or made into a source of profit. In this case, 
it specifically permitted baseline calculations of this human capital upon which economic analysis could 
be performed and the incentives embedded in the SIB technology could work. 
The purpose of this paper is not to consider the impact of the SIB on the Inbetweeners. 
Nonetheless, they and the impact of the bond upon them should be the focus of future research. In our 
most recent discussions with St 0XQJR¶V staff, anecdotal evidence suggests the Inbetweeners are aware 
WKDWWKH\DUHD³VSHFLDOJURXS´DQGWKDWadditional funds are available from which they can benefit. This 
FRXOGEH SURGXFLQJ DQ ³XQH[SHFWHG´ HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VSLULW We were told about one of the cohort who 
threatened to leave his tenanted accommodation unless he was given a television. He may not have been 
aware of the potential payment to St 0XQJR¶V for him remaining as a tenant for 12 months, nor of the 
even larger pay-out for 18 months. But, it is likely that the difference between the cost of the television 
and the amount paid by the SIB for someone remaining in tenanted accommodation would have been a 
calculation made by a St 0XQJR¶V employee at some level. 
DISCUSSION 
The preceding analysis has examined the use of financial innovation to restructure the field of 
homelessness services. The analysis has shown how the financial mechanism at the heart of this 
restructuring, the London Homelessness SIB, is constituted by and serves to reinforce a particular set of 
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rationalities. Through interviews and detailed analysis of documentary evidence, we have examined the 
creation, negotiation and implementation of this financial market solution to a social problem. In previous 
eras, it might have seemed peculiar to apply the technologies and mentalities that infuse the capital 
markets to the profound social issues surrounding those who live without stable housing. Yet, the 
incursion of financial technologies and mentalities into the social sector is now ubiquitous.20 For example, 
contracts are a central technology of SIBs. In this, they adopt the rationality of financial economic theory; 
organisations are portrayed as a nexus of contracts between self-interested (entrepreneurial) individuals 
and entities that specify how costs and rewards should be allocated among participants (see for example, 
Hayek, 1945, 1948; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under this theorization, accounting plays a contracting 
role to reduce agency costs in bond covenants and management compensation plans. Accounting 
functions in a similar way in the SIB arrangement. But, in playing this role in the context of the SIB, 
accounting does not merely specify contractual outcomes. Rather, it participates in, and is implicated in, a 
reordering of society, bringing those who are most vulnerable and those who serve them into new 
contractual relationships with each other, with the state, and with the finance industry. 
The penetration of SIBs into St 0XQJR¶V is a specific development that allows us to draw new 
insights into the more general incursion of neoliberalism into social policy (Woolford & Curran, 2013, p. 
47). SIBs are still at the experimental phase, so this case allows us to observe the technologies and 
mentalities of neoliberal governance in action as social space is rearranged. We have adopted a 
theorization of these phenomena that mobilizes the notion of biopolitics (Foucault, 1978, 2008). 
We can illuminate several striking features of this neoliberal arrangement. The outcomes set out 
in this SIB contract were, to varying degrees, of St 0XQJR¶V own making: in practical terms, St. 0XQJR¶V 
was involved in the development of the norms and metrics associated with the funding. This was perhaps 
because the state has an interest in ensuring that the early SIBs are ³successful´ and so would want to 
ensure that the outcome metrics are achievable and produce healthy returns to investors. The ways of 
                                                     
20 Literature in social poliF\LV³SDLQIXOO\DZDUH´(Woolford & Curran, 2013, p. 47) of the influence of neoliberalism 
on social policy. Nonetheless, it still seeks to understand how this incursion takes place. 
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achieving the outcomes did not form part of the contract and the use of individualised performance 
metrics serves to render broader social problems invisible. The arrangements take for granted that St. 
MXQJR¶V staff are entrepreneurial and so will act in a self-interested manner, presuming that they will 
indeed attempt to meet the outcome metrics. There is a financial animator at play too here. The staff 
funded by the SIB have precarious jobs and will want the SIB to succeed in the hope of future SIB or 
similar funding. SIBs HQKDQFHWKHVWDWH¶VDELOLW\WRPDNHFHUWDLQFODLPVDERXWLWVRZQILQDQFLDOFRQGXFW
The state will be able to claim that it can now trace the money it spends to particular outcomes. The state 
is no longer expected to concern itself with the means by which the outcomes are achieved. Thus, the 
performance metrics serve to wither fundamental concerns about the homeless into contractual interests in 
outcome measures. 
We can further explore the outcome measurements built into the London Homelessness SIB. 
8QGHUO\LQJHDFKPHWULFLVDQHROLEHUDOIRFXVRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DVDQHntrepreneur of 
the self. The emphasis on reducing rough sleeping, for instance, positions individuals who do so as an 
affront to the economic imperative of neoliberalism. Setting stable accommodation goals in London, a 
city in which the lack of affordable housing is a politically charged social issue, reinforces the notion that 
fixed addresses reflect moral citizenship. Goals for sustained reconnection to places of origin 
operationalize a view of the homeless as the Other, comprising those parts of society that are unwanted, 
the refugees and the illegal immigrants ± people who have may well have risked their lives for a better 
future ± but have failed. Progress towards employment, as an outcome measure, is linked not only to the 
ability of individuals to afford accommodation, but also to the moral obligation placed on them to become 
productive participants in the market economy ± successful entrepreneurs who maximise their human 
capital. Finally, EHWWHUPDQDJHPHQWRIRQH¶VKHDOWK FRGLILHVWKHGLVFLSOLQDU\UHTXLUHPHQWRI³FDUHRIVHOI´
placed on the enterprising individual in our society. Reflecting on these outcome metrics, we note that 
these are incredibly individualized. By their very nature, in fitting with the notion of the enterprising self, 
they enable blame to be placed on the individual when, for example, he or she does not find work or 
housing. The model is blind to underlying structural issues driving the inability to find work, or housing 
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market bubbles, or financial crises. It assumes that work and housing are available, and that it is merely 
up to the monitored individual to reach out and grab it. We are not suggesting that individuals at St. 
0XQJR¶V or the GLA, or even the investors themselves, are unconcerned with such underlying issues ± 
each of our interviewees expressed a concern for the homeless. What we are arguing is that the SIB 
model, akin to the earlier Nazi rationalisation so feared by the Ordo-liberals, leaves no room for such 
considerations and could be the next step towards the ultimate hyper-rationalized world that derives 
profits from the most vulnerable. 
The metrics, then, incorporate profound assumptions about the capacity and responsibility of the 
individual to act as an entrepreneur of the self; this is the case with the Inbetweeners, the navigators, the 
investors, and also the commissioner. These metrics are about how individuals are expected to function in 
society. Self-interested desire to meet the contractual objectives is assumed. The outcomes specify what 
each agent must achieve to function as moral citizens.  
Thus it is clear that these outcomes are not discreet and independent elements of an isolated social 
service contract, but are integral to the neoliberal reform of the state and society. In keeping with 
Foucault, Schram et al. (2010) VWDWHWKDWXQGHUQHROLEHUDOLVP³WKHZHOIDUHVWDWHLVQRWµUROOHGEDFN¶LQWKH
VHQVHRIEHLQJUHGXFHGLWLVµUROOHGRXW¶WRGLYHUVHORFDOHVDQGQRQVWDWHDFWRUV«DQGLWLVµUROOHGXS¶LQD
WUDQVIRUPDWLYH GLVFLSOLQDU\ SURMHFW RI PDUNHW UDWLRQDOLW\´ (p. 742). In this particular case, the 
biopoliticization of the homeless involves a chain of disciplinary relationships running through national 
and local governments, finance firms, banks, local service providers, and homeless service users. Along 
WKLV FKDLQ ³EHQFKPDUNV IRU RXWFRPHV DUH HVWDEOLVKHG DQG PRQLWRUHG DQG PDQDJHULDO WHFKQLTXHV
LQFHQWLYHVDQGSHQDOWLHVDUHXVHGWRGLVFLSOLQHDFWRUVEHORZ´(Schram et al., 2010, p. 747). 
/LWHUDWXUH KDV ORQJ UHFRJQL]HG DFFRXQWLQJ¶V UROH LQ SXWWLQJ SDUWLFXODU DLPV RI JRYHUQPHQW RI
populations into practice, by its ability to make social spaces calculable, produce knowledge about 
subjects that are the object of particular government ideas, and offer the technical means to move from 
idea to action (Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1991). In this study, we have 
H[DPLQHGDVSHFLILFLQVWDQFHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWRISRSXODWLRQRQHZKLFKKDVDWWHPSWHGWRLQWURGXFH³WKH
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PDUNHW´LQDQH[SOLFLWPDQQer. However, instead of a free market, we have witnessed the introduction of a 
specific, deliberately cultivated set of investors, inserted into a programme to serve a symbolic function. 
This development in social service provision and funding moves us beyond New Public Management 
notions of cost-effectiveness and value for money, which have been the subject of much prior research, 
DQG LQWRD IRUFHG LQWHQVLILFDWLRQRI³PDUNHW´ LQYROYHPHQW LQSURJUDPPHGHOLYHU\:KLOHSULRU UHVHDUFK
has focused on settings in which the aim has been, rhetorically at least, cost-cutting and cost-savings, here 
we witness the explicit aim of the programme to produce profits for one of the parties involved, the 
investor. The profits come from named individuals ± ³IDLOHGHQWUHSUHQHXUV´UHFRQVWLWXWHGDVOLYLQJFDVK-
flows. 
The SIB arrangement is thus self-FRQWUDGLFWRU\ DQ HQJLQHHUHG ³PDUNHW-EDVHG´ VROXWLRQ $V DQ
ostensibly market-based solution to a social problem, it carries with it the plethora of neoliberal 
UDWLRQDOLWLHV,W³FXUHV´KRPHOHVVQHVVQRWE\³FXULQJ´VRFLHW\EXWE\UHPRYLQJVRFLHW\IURPWKHHTXDWLRQ
,Q VRFLHW\¶V VWHDG LW LQWURGXFHV contracts, profit incentives, risk taking, and outcome measurement; or 
DOWHUQDWHO\SXW LWHOLPLQDWHV IURPWKHQRWLRQRI³VRFLHW\´HYHU\WKing except these calculative aspects of 
self-interest that suit a market ideology, even if no market exists. Homelessness becomes a market arena 
in its own right where individuals, both the homeless and the contract service worker, are pushed to 
develop their human capital and offer their labour to the highest bidder. St 0XQJR¶V explicit role is to 
accomplish the requisite change in the identity of its homeless clients: 
7KHLULGHQWLWLHVDUHGHILQHGE\WKHLUVWDWHRISDVVDJHIURPWKHGHJUDGHGUROHRIµGHSHQGHQW¶WR
WKHYDORUL]HGUROHRIµZRUNHU¶± from disordered and irresponsible drains on society to orderly 
subjects who function as self-sufficient actors in markets and communities. (Schram et al., 
2010, p. 744). 
7KDWLVWKHLULGHQWLWLHVPXVWEHFKDQJHGIURPWKHGHJUDGHGUROHRIµURXJKVOHHSHU¶WRWKHYDORUL]HG
UROHRIµVWDEOHDQGKRXVHG¶7KLVFKDQJHGHWHUPLQHVWKHLUZRUWKWRWKHLQYHVWRUV 
Herein lies what we argue is one of the crucial insights in this study. The mechanisms used to 
motivate this change, from one identity to another, construct specific new ways of seeing and thinking 
about the homeless. The mentalities implicit in these mechanisms carry particular (even unpalatable) 
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implications. In the case of the London Homelessness SIB, the value of the bond depends crucially upon, 
and indeed is securitized by, the actions of these homeless individuals. Their ability to move through the 
particular phases codified by the outcome metrics is monetized and captured by the investors who paid to 
have this happen. Thus, the system securitizes the most vulnerable for the profit of those most able to pay. 
The homeless, amongst other social pathologies, have continually been the subject of analysis on the 
reduction of costs and the increase of efficiency in the delivery of services. In that sense, the SIB project 
is nothing unusual. However, it is qualitatively unique to commodify the homeless in the manner 
undertaken in the SIB project. 
The roll out of neoliberal mentalities into this arena is heavily bound up with notions of risk and 
LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH UHPRYDO RI VWDWH VXSSRUWHG ³VRFLDOL]DWLRQ´ RI ULVN. One of the expressly claimed 
³DFFRPSOLVKPHQWV´RIWKH6,%LVWRSDVVWKHULVNRIIDLOXUHLQFKDQJLQJKRPHOHVVLGHQWLWLHVfrom the state 
to investors. Risk is dealt with at the boundaries of partnerships, such as between the state and social 
service providers (Miller et al., 2008). We find that the SIB arrangement ± a partnership involving the 
state, the finance sector, social service providers, and investors ± partitions risk in distinct ways for each 
member. 
)LUVWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH6,%¶VGesign, the risk is assumed to pass on to the investors, who expect a 
return in exchange for putting up their funds to an uncertain outcome. MacDonald (2014), an economist 
with the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, identifies a number of problems with this simplistic 
view of risk-shifting under an SIB. Our study finds empirical support for his assertions. We can see that 
one of the express aims of the pURJUDPPH LQQRYDWLRQ LQ VRFLDO VHUYLFHV WR ³VROYH´ LVVXHV VXFK DV
homelessness, is not and likely never can be rewarded. St. 0XQJR¶V was a winning bidder in part because 
of their proven track record, whilst others with more innovative ideas lost out. Thus, the kinds of risk that 
the investors are willing to underwrite are already circumscribed. This makes perfect sense when viewed 
with a market mentality: the first rule of portfolio management is that investors never select a project with 
highly uncertain outcomes when other, more certain, opportunities exist with similar expected returns. If 
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the goal is to attract funding to this otherwise unknown field, innovative and hence risky projects will 
have to be avoided. 
Second, the amount of the risk of failing to meet outcome targets that will, in practice, fall to the 
investors, remains an open question. Projects with unrealized outcomes are highly unlikely simply to pay 
nothing back to investors.21 This is especially true when the RYHUDOO ³SIB programme´ depends on its 
reputation for achieving outcomes The global SIB programme, viewed as a project to colonize social 
programmes by members of the finance industry, demands that returns be positive if it is to succeed. 
Third, and linked to the previous point, it becomes risky for St 0XQJR¶V itself to fail to achieve 
the outcomes. One not unlikely outcome of failure would include being excluded from future SIB 
RSSRUWXQLWLHV+HUHWKHPDUNHWPHQWDOLW\EULQJVZLWKLWDIHDURIWKH³IOLJKWRIFDSLWDO´7KHVDPHWKUHDWRI 
capital mobility that characterizes relations between profit-seeking firms and the capital markets (Arnold 
& Oakes, 1998) thus intrudes into the area of social service provision for the poor. This fear will drive 
social sector organizations to restructure delivery of programmes, cut costs elsewhere, or make other 
changes in order to achieve the outcomes they have contracted to achieve (MacDonald, 2014). 
Finally, in the St 0XQJR¶V SIB programme, a new risk is constructed concerning the identity of 
the individual service user, that is, the homeless individual upon whose behaviour the entire system rests. 
It is already recognized that neoliberal approaches to governing nonprofit social service providers 
discourage activities that address unjust social conditions, in favour of targeting risky and irresponsible 
individuals (Woolford & Curran, 2013, p. 46). Homeless service users at St 0XQJR¶V were, prior to the 
introduction of the SIB, already painted with the biopolitical stripe of being engaged in risky (failed 
entrepreneurial) behaviours like rough sleeping and addiction. The SIB programme continues the 
targeting of these behaviours, but with the introduction of new categories and labels. If these individuals 
GR QRW PHHW WKH VSHFLILHG LQFRPHV WKH\ QRW RQO\ UHPDLQ FDWHJRUL]HG DV ³ULVN\´ WR WKH VRFLHW\ WKURXJK
which the government acts, but they also become akin to a credit risk to market investors. That is, in the 
                                                     
21 For example, the downside to Goldman Sachs was limited to 25% of its investment in the Rikers Island youth 
recidivism SIB (MacDonald, 2014). 
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same way that individuals, securitized as mortgage holders in mortgage-backed securities, become 
SDUWLFXODU PDUNHW ULVNV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKHLU SD\PHQW DQG GHIDXOW SDWWHUQV KRPHOHVV LQGLYLGXDOV¶ OLIH
experiences are now part of a pattern of risk to investors in the SIB scheme. Extrapolating to St 0XQJR¶V, 
the same market mentality applies: the ability of St 0XQJR¶V to produce changes in behaviours is itself an 
uncertainty that translates the service provider itself into a measurable risk for investors. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset, we had proposed contributions in two separate, but inter-related, streams of 
literature. First, we sought to theorize the neoliberal rationalities now colonizing public services. To do 
VRZHKDYHLQWURGXFHG)RXFDXOW¶V (1978, 2008) notion of biopolitics into this setting. This has helped us 
to recognize how certain important beliefs underpin the mechanisms found within SIB funding 
arrangements: that it is possible and even desirable to formulate contractual outcomes related to social 
concerns; that agents will act in their self-interest in order to meet such outcomes; and, perhaps most 
profoundly, that homelessness (rather, the outcomes related to the homeless) is a business opportunity 
that will provide a financial return on investment. These beliefs drive the structure of SIBs and the way in 
which they are being introduced to the homelessness service sector. 
Second, WKH VWXG\ KDV FRQWULEXWHG LQVLJKWV LQWR DFFRXQWLQJ¶V UROH LQ effecting neoliberal social 
policy and consequently in the management of populations (Graham, 2010; Miller & O'Leary, 1987; 
Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1991). We have examined DFFRXQWLQJ¶VUROHLQWKHFRQWUDFWXDORXWFRPHVWKDW
are so characteristic of the SIB arrangement, the accounting calculations that provide the needed rationale 
for the programme (e.g. cost-savings, discounted cash flows, profitability, return on investment, etc.), and 
the linking of accounting and performance measures constructed from the database that made the day-to-
day activities of the homeless visible, in ways deemed necessary to demonstrate outcome achievements. 
We have seen how accounting for results underpins the financial instruments used to shift the boundary 
between public, private, and nonprofit sectors (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008; Miller et al., 2008; Neu, 
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2006), and how these shifts are predicated on changes in the way risk is allocated amongst the state, 
nonprofit service providers, and investors, not forgetting the employees of the service providers and the 
homeless themselves, who are also asked to take on risk. 
In terms of our contribution towards an understanding of accounting, we first highlight, once 
again, the crucial and constitutive role accounting has played here. Not only did it make possible the cost 
estimations, NPV calculations and performance monitoring framework, it also gave material substance to 
the notion that profit could be made from the homeless life-course. By producing a profit, it enabled a link 
to the investors who were incentivized to participate. These techniques, though, are not new in the domain 
of accounting. What is new is the application of these techniques so directly to the provision of a social 
service, within the rationality of biopolitics and neoliberalism. This leads to a more profound conclusion. 
We saw how, by drawing on these techniques to implement the SIB, the state loses some of its ability to 
evaluate critically its own activities from a human and policy perspective, since the evaluation becomes 
deeply embedded in the accounting technologies. As noted, such technologies are themselves not immune 
from criticism. We argue that there is something profoundly wrong when flawed financial technologies 
can become engines of social policy. 
This study has thus begun what we hope is a future body of research that reflects on the stark 
changes in the organization of the agents in the governance of society, the potential changes in their 
habitus as they negotiate the new mentalities demanded of them, and their roles as moral citizens in the 
neoliberal order, of which the SIB arrangement is one manifestation. The major limitation of this research 
is that it is too early to discuss the impact of the SIB on the homeless themselves. They should be the 
focus of future research. 
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APPENDIX 1: CONFIGURATION OF FUNDING RELATIONS 
 
Source: http://www.russellwebster.com/social-impact-bonds-and-homelessness/ 
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APPENDIX 2: SOCIAL IMPACT BOND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
Stage Accounting Technology 
Design  
Assessment of service area which needs 
reshaping 
This must be within the budget of the commissioner 
Definition of the social issues Accounting technologies are required at this stage to set out social 
trends and their related cost pressures 
Definition of outcome metrics and 
interventions 
Management control/accounting technologies are required to 
develop indicative output metrics 
Value-for-money case Financial model to assess potential savings as a result of the 
interventions 
Programme design Due diligence on potential service providers requires financial 
accounting. Outcome measurements finalised. Payment framework 
set up. 
Execution  
Procurement Accounting will be used by those bidding on the contracts to 
evaluate their ability to deliver the programme at the price, and by 
those reviewing the bids to ensure the professionalism and 
competence of the bidders 
Contracting Accounting technologies are central to the contract which contains 
performance measures, and returns to bond purchasers. 
Appointment of a Project Director or 
Performance Manager 
This individual will closely monitor performance to ensure that the 
SHUIRUPDQFHRXWFRPHVDUHRQWUDFN,IWKH\DUHQ¶WWKHQWKHservice 
provider can be removed and replaced by another 
Completion  
SIB payment Payments are made (or not) on the basis of the performance 
measurement criteria in the contract. 
 
